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ABSTRACT
This document presents the findings of a study
of the present international broadcast operations
of the Voice of America, and makes recommendations
for actions felt necessary for the VOA to maintain
its present stature among world broadcasters for
the coming decades. Particular topics discussed are
the international transmitter power race,
possibilities for signal enhancement by improved
antenna technology and control, jamming, issues to
be considered in planning for satellite direct
broadcast radio services, other new-technology
means of reaching at least part of the worldwide
audience, and the possibilities for cost savings
through automation of relay station equipment and
computer aids for headquarters operations.
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FOREWORD
The study under this contract was carried out over the
period 1 March 1982 though 31 January 1983, and the Final
Report, dated 10 February 1983, was submitted to VOA in
fulfillment of the contract. At the time, however, not all
the reviewers to whom the report had been sent had had time
to return their comments. VOA agreed that a revised Final
Report should be prepared if it was deemed by M.I.T. that
the remaining comments so warranted.
This 25 April 1983 revision incorporates a number of
corrections, rewordings, and minor additions made as a
result of those reviewer comments; also the opportunity was
taken to rewrite and expand two sections pertaining to
receiver technology for improved clarity of the suggestions
presented (Sections II-B and III-B-3). Recommendation No.
16 has been added to the Summary.
An Executive Summary, bound separately, has also been
prepared to present the key findings of the study in a less
formidable document for those not needing to know all the
details.
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INTRODUCTION
As the number of countries doing short wave broadcasting has
grown to 123 today, and as more and more of them build superpower
transmitters, it becomes ever harder for the Voice of America to
reach its worldwide audience through the crowded airwaves. The
problem is compounded by Soviet jamming and by the fact that much
of the American transmission plant was built in the 1950's and is
technologically, and even physically obsolete.
In response to these problems numerous proposals have been made
during the past two decades for the U.S. Government to invest in
upgrading the present transmitter facilities and building new
ones, using modern technology. The capital investment needed to
give America an effective Voice for the coming two or more
critical decades, while small in the total national security
picture, will be hundreds of millions of dollars.
Conscious of this problem, the Research Program on Communications
Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology approached
the management of the Voice of America in July 1981, and
suggested that it would be advisable to take an independent
outside view of the proposals coming before VOA to assess whether
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they are moving technically and at reasonable costs in the right
direction. That was the origin of this study.
We make no pretense in a small 6 man-month study to have examined
engineering plans for specific sites or details of alternatives.
We have looked at the basic planning ideas that are now in the
pipeline to assess them in the light of the present state of the
art of radio communication. In this report we present our
conclusions which are largely in concurrence with VOA's present
engineering plans, but we do raise a few important questions,
some of which can only be answered by detailed engineering and
economic studies, and a few of which require decision at the
highest levels of U.S. policy making.
While this is primarily a technical study, it has crucial
political parameters. A judgment of the kind of transmission
facilities that should now be built for the future depends on
estimates of who it is that will need to be reached in what parts
of the world, how severe the jamming of broadcasts will be, what
kind of quality of-reception audiences will demand before they
will listen, what countries will allow relay transmitters on
their territories, and other such non-technical questions.
The study was done by an interdisciplinary team. John E. Ward of
the Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems of MIT is an
electrical engineer who has worked for many years in the fields
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of radio and communications systems. Ithiel de Sola Pool is a
Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director of the
Institute's Research Program on Communications Policy. Prof. Pool
has earlier done studies for the Voice of the audience size for
foreign broadcasting in the USSR. The third member of the team
was Richard Jay Solomon, a specialist in communications and
transportation planning, who has recently completed a study of
future technologies for radio broadcasting.
The plan for the study included visits and discussions at VOA's
two Washington, D.C. headquarters locations, visits to typical
U.S. and overseas transmitting sites, and discussions with a
number of non-VOA people determined to have expertise in areas
pertinent to the study. These were all accomplished, except that
only one transmitting site was visited -- the Greenville, North
Carolina relay station. A planned trip to Europe to visit VOA,
RFE/RL, BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Swiss International Radio
transmitting facilities, ITU/IFRB, EBU, and several transmitter
manufacturers was cancelled at VOA request.
In the several trips to VOA Headquarters in the period March-May,
1982, we visited the following offices, most more than once, and
met with a large number of people:
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Deputy Associate Director, Plans and Programs
Deputy Director, Programs for News and Current Affairs
Director, Office of Engineering and Technical Operations
Chief, Frequency Division
Chief, Frequency Utilization Branch
Chief, Operations Division
Chief, Operations Management Staff
Chief, Special Projects Division
These visits provided a good deal of insight on VOA operations
and technology, and a large number of pertinent documents were
obtained for study.
The procedure for non-VOA interviews was to identify a list of
candidates through a process of calling those on a small initial
list and getting recommendations for additional people to
interview. Some 50 names were obtained in this way. Then a
background paper and a list of questions for discussion were
prepared and mailed to the persons to be interviewed. These two
documents are reproduced in the Appendix. Interviews were mostly
by telephone, but some were done in person. Understandably,
differences in opinion on some topics were evident in the
interviews. Where pertinent, interview information has been
identified throughout the report, but not necessarily by source.
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SUMMARY
The Voice of America has a world-wide audience of many
millions, particularly in lands where access to information is
not readily available, and particularly among the politically
alert.
This massive audience is a great asset in the conduct of
American foreign policy. The Voice's cost/effectiveness exceeds
that of most other means of influence.
Present VOA transmission facilities largely date back to the
1950's and 1960's and are becoming obsolete in the increasingly
crowded airwaves in which 123 countries are now broadcasting by
shortwave. Overseas, VOA has transmitters of 250-kW rating in
place. Other countries already have 81 500-kW transmitters in
operation with more under construction. What should VOA do?
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
The key points developed in this study are as follows. The
rationale for each is developed in later sections.
1. VOA's problem of reaching the listener audience in the
increasingly crowded HF spectrum does not seem to be best
solved by simply increasing transmitter power everywhere,
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which has a major effect on operating expenses. New antenna
technology, including narrower, flexibly-directable beams
could yield the same or better increases in signal levels at
existing power levels in many instances. (See also 2. below.)
2. In addition, VOA should investigate means for real-time,
dynamic optimization of transmission parameters, rather than
operating almost entirely on the basis of propagation
predictions made many months ahead. Backscatter sounding,
both of the ionosphere and the target area, seems to show
great promise for beam-elevation control, particularly with
recent developments in correlation detection for isolating
backscatter signals from other received energy. Real-time
feedback of signal measurements from monitoring stations
should also be investigated as an alternate or an adjunct to
backscatter sounding. Power increases should come only after
all other signal-delivery optimization means have been fully
utilized, and on a case-by-case basis.
3. VOA presently plans and operates its facilities with two
fixed "rules of thumb" for minimum delivered signal levels
and multiple-frequency, simultaneous transmissions per
program per time zone; one rule for unjammed broadcasts, and
the other for jammed broadcasts. Such fixed rules, applied
worldwide, do not take into account varying reception
conditions in the intended listening areas, and there is
probably "overkill" in some situations and "underkill" in
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others. Examples of reception conditions which vary widely
in various parts of the world are background noise level, the
number and strengths of interfering signals of other
broadcasters, and the effectiveness of jamming, when present.
A procedure which could make better use of VOA resources
would be to analyze each program delivery situation and
allocate transmission facilities to it only as necessary to
deliver reliable, listenable signals. Dynamic allocation on
a near-real-time basis should be the goal.
4. The VOA seems to lag in the application of computer
technology to save time and manpower in many of its critical
ongoing operations at its Washington Headquarters. The
analyses called for in the preceding paragraphs both require
computer modeling. Also, there are two current, intensely
manual operations that could benefit greatly from computer
aids: the preparation, editing, and inter-office transmission
of program text material, and the complex task of preparing
new frequency schedules and transmitter assignments four
times per year. Computer aids could result in a better
product at less cost in both of these areas.
5. The technology of communication is changing rapidly, and the
VOA should be preparing to exploit the newer means that could
be used to reach certain of its audiences. These include:
distribution of material in cassette and audio-diskette
forms; leasing channels on CATV systems, TV (particularly as
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TV-DSB develops worldwide), and existing radio facilities
(AM, FM, and HF); and radio-DSB (see 6. below). While there
is little availability at present of programmable audio
recorders, or market for them, the addition of such recorders
to shortwave radios could permit capture of VOA HF
transmissions made in non-prime hours for later playback at a
time convenient to the listener. Transmission times could
then be chosen for minimum interference and/or best
propagation. See also 9. below.
6. The question of radio direct-satellite broadcasting (DSB) for
delivery of VOA programming raises a large number of issues.
Its advantages include freedom from present relay station
siting problems for certain areas of the world, and perhaps
greater resistance to jamming. Problems to solve include
political issues (including frequency allocation), system
design, and listeners having to all obtain new receivers. The
present 26-MHz international broadcast band has been
considered in several recent DSB proposals because it is an
existing allocation that is very underutilized. However, only
an estimated 10% of worldwide shortwave receivers in place
can receive this band, thus new receivers would be required.
For a variety of reasons, radio-DSB at UHF appears to be a
better choice if a frequency allocation can be obtained at
future international radio conferences. Time is short and
this matter should have a high priority.
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7. Any utilization of new receiver facilities, whether it be for
satellite broadcasts, for changed frequencies such as 26-MHz,
or for better reception depends upon millions of persons
worldwide buying the receiver equipment. That means that
shifting to new means of communication is a decade-long
process, during which the present shortwave frequencies and
types of reception facilities must continue to be the major
medium used. It also means that in plans for moving to more
modern means of transmission, incentives must be provided to
the world public to adopt the new technology.
Relatively few people will buy new receivers to listen to VOA
alone. They will buy them to receive a rich and varied menu
of radio broadcasts. So, to make satellite radio or other new
approaches a reality, the United States should encourage the
creation of common-carrier or cooperative arrangements
whereby many different countries and broadcasters will use
common facilities to air diverse messages and varied program
material. In such an environment VOA will find its audience;
without such many-sided development there will be none. It is
therefore in American interests to encourage all countries to
to participate in common-carrier arrangements and low-cost
receiver developments that will make it possible.
8. Jamming, particularly that by the Soviet Union, has become a
major international problem, polluting much of the allocated
shortwave broadcast spectrum worldwide. Technical means to
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break through to Soviet-bloc listeners are only marginally
effective, and quite costly from the equipment and operations
standpoints. While planning for such measures should
certainly proceed as suggested herein, all possible means
(political, economic, and cultural) to induce the Soviets and
others who are jamming to desist should also be explored.
9. One of the best counters to increased congestion (and
jamming) in the HF bands lies not at the transmitter, but at
the receiver. While the quality of the receivers in the
hands of listeners is not generally under the broadcaster's
control, it might be cost-effective for the U.S. government
to underwrite the development of improved shortwave receivers
that could be mass-produced and distributed at a price
affordable by VOA's listeners, at least those in the
free-world. Improvements in selectivity, stability, and
overload resistance in low-cost receivers would be
particularly desirable. A programmable recorder for
unattended capture of programs would also be helpful (see 5.
above), and could built in. Subsidization of receiver costs
might also be considered to aid distribution and sale to
particularly important areas.
10. Overseas relay sites located within only one ionospheric
reflection hop of intended audiences are crucial to delivery
of competitive signals at prime local listening times.
Present sites must therefore be maintained and upgraded, and
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new sites sought to fill present coverage holes. The
realities of multi-hop HF propagation are that stateside
transmitters, even if technically augmented, cannot be
competitive throughout much of Europe and Asia or in parts of
Africa and South America. If VOA were to be forced to
broadcast only from the Continental U.S., its signals in its
priority listening areas would be heard for fewer hours per
day, and even for those hours would be much weaker and much
less reliable.
11. The question of small versus large transmitter sites for new
construction has been examined and discussed with a large
number of people. There has been general agreement that while
the economics of construction and operation favor the
combining of transmitters for a number of program services
into a few large sites, having a larger number of
geographically dispersed small sites offers much more
flexibility in beam directions to counter jamming, and can be
more cost-effective in terms of VOA's main goal -- delivering
good signals to its priority audiences. The consequences of
losing a small site are also less disastrous than losing a
large site.
12. The reliability problems encountered in the satellite relay
feeds activated in the past few years have encouraged VOA to
maintain operation of its traditional HF relay feed system as
a backup, despite substantial operating costs. Since the
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problems have been mainly with the local PTT landlines from
the downlinks to the sites, every effort should be made to
arrange for on-site downlink antennas, making whatever
reasonable political tradeoffs or settlements are necessary
with the PTT's, so that the HF relay feed backup can be
eliminated, or at least greatly reduced in cost.
13. Most of VOA's worldwide transmission facilities are at least
two decades old, and becoming a maintenance burden. Some
badly need replacement. In addition, most are lacking any
degree of automation and require large on-site staffs for
operation. Because of the remoteness of most sites, the risks
of sabotage, and the complexities of VOA HF operations, it
does not appear that fully automated, unmanned sites, such as
used by U.S. domestic broadcasters and some foreign HF
broadcasters, are feasible for VOA. There is, however, much
more that the VOA could do with semi-automation. In acquiring
new or replacement transmission equipment, every effort
should be made to take advantage of those automation aids
that are now commercially available to reduce site manning
requirements. This could also increase capability for signal
optimization (as in 1. and 2. above) and for coordinated,
multi-site control for anti-jamming purposes.
14. It does not appear that VOA presently has any ongoing "crisis
planning" activity to anticipate and prepare contingency
plans for such events as losing sites on short notice from
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accident or for political reasons, or abrupt changes in
programming and target audience, such as occurred a year ago
in the Polish situation. Just as the military has its war
games to prepare for the unexpected, VOA should regularly
conduct "what if" exercises to best prepare for whatever may
arise in a world that seems increasingly unsettled.
15. It is clear that VOA has been suffering in recent years from
staff shortages, resulting partly from increasing costs
during a period of fairly level year-to-year budgets. This
has hit Engineering particularly hard. Coupled with the
problems of operating an aging plant and the lack of
equipment money for computer aids (see 4. above), this has
left VOA unprepared to cope with the technical planning for
the facilities expansions and updates desired for the next
decade. A most common comment from the sources consulted was
that VOA's most serious need is to beef up its engineering,
research, and development staff and efforts. Much has been
initiated along these lines since last July, but we can only
emphasize that this must be carried through and adequately
supported with the necessary working resources so that VOA
can cope in the future in the increasingly complex world of
international broadcasting, i.e., continue to be able to
reach its listening audience.
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16. Finally, VOA should take steps to institutionalize access to
information on technical matters, both within and outside the
Government. It seems clear that other Government agencies
know details of Soviet HF installations and operations that
would be of great value to VOA in its planning for the
future, but that there has been no regular channel of
communication, possibly because of security considerations.*
Informed opinion of technical experts in the private sector
also needs to be made known at all levels of VOA on a
continuing basis. VOA's mission is too important to the
United States to be conducted without all the technical
information and guidance that the country as a whole can
bring to bear.
*In this regard, a contact at the National Security Agency who
was sent a survey questionaire thought initially that he would be
able to provide valuable answers, but later reported that he was
unable to obtain approval to respond to the questionaire in any
way.
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I. VOA IN TRANSITION
VOA's mission is clearly stated in its mandate from Congress to
be the voice of the United States' Government, and to provide a
fair interpretation of events and information for its listeners.
To achieve this, VOA has to maintain the proper level of
credibility, interest and professionalism so that a large, and
important segment of the world takes it seriously, regularly
turning to the VOA's outlets to keep informed, educated, and
perhaps even entertained. No one element of the VOA's
communications resources will be sufficient to accomplish this
task; only the VOA taken as a whole can reach this understanding
among the world's listeners. Our assignment is to assess the
role that modern and changing communications technology should
play in this procedure.
Despite the continual changes in the world political and
technological situation, the Voice's staff have done a remarkably
good job over the years in keeping up with the transitions.
Microelectronics, satellites and computers are, however, rapidly
changing telecommunications technology, and changes in
broadcasting itself can be expected to accelerate in the next
decade or two. This may further dilute VOA's ability to
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discharge its important responsibilities. Since the Second World
War, when the Voice of America was formed from the private
international short-wave stations of NBC and CBS, high-frequency
radio broadcasting technology has remained relatively stagnant,
while the high-frequency spectrum has become more crowded,
jamming from Soviet-bloc countries has increased, and shortwave
listeners have had an increasingly novel array of alternative
channels vying for their attention.
Increasingly, the demand for news, information and entertainment,
formerly provided to remote regions of the world by short-wave
broadcasters is being met by other media. Sound and images with
consistently higher quality than that delivered by HF has
diverted potential audiences. Where once the backwaters of the
world could stay in touch only by HF radio on a daily basis,
today in virtually every corner of the globe one finds the
ubiquitous cassette recorder with its hi-fidelity recordings. In
most urbanized regions, we have seen the recent growth of
higher-power medium-wave AM radio stations, FM broadcasts, and
broadcast television. Coming rapidly, to the more affluent elite
audiences, are videocassettes and videodisks; and on its heels,
satellite-based national television systems may provide video
delivery even to the least affluent areas.
Yet VOA's overwhelming task of providing daily broadcasts via a
complex worldwide network, coordinated with demands for spectrum
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from allied and friendly countries, and hampered by jamming and
its functional equivalent -- interference and band-hopping -- by
competitors, is not to be taken lightly. For at least the rest
of this Century, short wave broadcasting will remain as important
as it has been, and probably more so. In an ever more
interdependent and shrinking world, communicating America's
message will be increasingly important in achieving the
legitimate foreign policy goals of the people and government of
this country. New means of communicating the message, such as
satellite television broadcasts, international computer networks,
and international direct dial telephony will be coming into use.
While the time for planning for such novel means of international
communications is at hand, nothing on the horizon is going to
seriously reduce the importance of short wave listening until
well into the 21st century.
In the United States, where few people ever listen to foreign
broadcasts, it is easy to underestimate the significance of
international broadcasting. In this country studies show only
about 2 per cent of the population making any use of short wave.
(2) That fact, however, only shows that the American public has
basic confidence in the domestic sources of news available to it.
In general, one finds a close correlation between lack of
confidence in domestic news sources and turning to foreign radio
(2) Smith, Don. D., "America's Short Wave Audience", Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 33, pp 537-548.
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for information. In countries where there is heavy censorship and
news control the audience for foreign broadcasts is massive.
About a billion persons can receive shortwave broadcasts. Based
on careful research, VOA has estimated that it has an audience of
66 million persons who listen at least weekly, and that 38
million of these are in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where
distrust of the local news sources is widespread.
In these "denied" areas, not only is there an eagerness to listen
to foreign broadcasts, but there is also no alternative means of
communication of comparable value. Foreign travel, contact with
foreigners and circulation of uncensored printed material is
severely restricted. But the governments of those countries have
not dared to deny their people shortwave sets. For one thing,
people in the market in those countries generally will not buy
radios without some shortwave capability. In the Soviet Union a
moonlighting profession has grown up of people who can adapt sets
to receive foreign shortwave broadcasts. Also, the Soviets
because of their large land mass have to use some shortwave to
broadcast to Siberia, and so their standard sets have shortwave
capability for frequencies up to 15 MHz.
But it is not just in the censored Communist world that short-
wave broadcasting serves peoples' needs. In poor countries that
have underdeveloped news facilities and low press circulation
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millions of people turn to such sources as the BBC and VOA to
keep themselves informed about world events. For much of the
world's population, therefore, international broadcasting plays a
vital role in helping the population maintain a realistic and
accurate image of what is really going on. From the American
point of view, it helps to keep them informed about the real
viewpoints and activity of our country, in contrast to what is
portrayed by biased opponents.
While there may be billions of people too discouraged to care,
there are in every country, no matter how dictatorial or free its
regime, an alert, usually educated, stratum who are intensely
interested in looking at foreign experiences and models for their
country. These professionals and politically minded people form
a growing audience for a "world service" that is not necessarily
addressed to their country. They are the target of the world
service programs provided by the Soviets as well as those from
the West. Many of them are willing and even eager to listen in
English. There is, thus, both an audience for foreign language
programs addressed to the particular interests of the countries
to which the broadcasts are aimed, and also for world service
programs in English addressed to the internationally minded
"upscale" audiences. The differences in level and style of these
two kinds of programming are not our subject here. What is
relevant to us in this report is that both kinds of service are
needed and each requires its appropriate means of delivery.
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Any change in VOA's facilities intended to meet those needs has
to be planned carefully, weighing the many options, and
delineating the risks if change comes too fast or too slowly.
Nevertheless, the change is basically being forced from the
outside in a radically changing world of listeners and
broadcasters.
PROBLEMS
The specific problems to be faced by VOA in the coming two
decades can be broadly separated into the following areas, some
of which overlap considerably:
1) Signal delivery strength -- the ability to make
itself heard reliably and well in those areas of the
world where the United States Government needs to
deliver news, views, and educational materials;
2) Spectrum availability -- the need and ability of all
nations to make themselves heard in the HF and MW
bands;
3) Jamming -- the negation of the usefulness of much of
the best HF broadcast spectrum by Soviet-bloc, and
other countries, with effects far beyond their borders;
4) Audience fragmentation -- the ability to get its
message heard in an world of information-overload;
5) Resource management -- the ability to coordinate a
complex network, plan for the future, develop along
with new technology, and attract the necessary skills
and talent within the framework of the Federally-funded
and operated agency, and do so in a most efficient
manner.
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SOME SOLUTIONS
The solutions to these problems rests in the correct mix of
technology, politics, and management strategy. The VOA will have
to remain fluid in its approach, since no one way points to the
future. These solutions will be found in these areas:
1) Technological changes -- signal delivery parameters,
more efficient utilization of the broadcast spectrum
and use of other modes of program and information
distribution, and use of modern management tools based
on computers and highspeed telecommunications systems;
2) Political measures -- an approach which encourages
the most stable set of broadcasting methods and means
in an increasingly unstable world political arena;
3) Management reorganization during a continuing
transition without disrupting VOA's primary mission of
daily broadcasting.
SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM GOALS
In the near-term, VOA will have to face increasing pressures to
reach certain specific audiences; these problems may be separated
from the longer-term goals of utilizing novel technologies such
as satellites, digital wireline communications, video and
electronic text displays. However, a transition must be designed
so that clearly defined short-term solutions do not impinge on
less precise long-term evolution.
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II. SIGNAL DELIVERY AND SPECTRUM UTILIZATION
FOR DIRECT VOA BROADCASTING
A. SIGNAL DELIVERY
1. BACKGROUND
In delivering listenable audio signals to its world-wide audience
via HF broadcasting, VOA has three types of interfering signals
to overcome:
- noise from various sources (the radio receiver,
man-made but non-radio electrical "static", and
natural HF energy),
- interfering signals of other HF broadcasters,
- deliberate jamming of VOA broadcasts.
Life would be a lot easier for both VOA and its listeners if only
the natural and man-made, non-radio noise sources were involved,
since these are almost always much weaker than radio
interference, whether from other broadcasters or from jamming.
The VOA has designed and operated its facilities for a number of
years with a goal of delivering a signal (field) strength of one
millivolt per meter or more in its intended listening areas.
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This goal is not always realized, but is the standard in the
absence of jamming. For transmissions that it expects to be
jammed, the minimum signal strength goal is raised to 2.5
millivolts per meter. The one millivolt per meter level is
considerably above the sensitivity of almost any HF receiver (the
better ones have sensitivity down to one microvolt at the antenna
terminals), and also generally well above all but the worst
levels of environmental (non-radio) noise. It was based on
overcoming interference from other HF broadcasts.
HF international broadcasting has quite a different interference
situation than AM, FM, and TV broadcasting in the U.S., where
transmitter-site/frequency pairs are assigned so that strong
signals are spaced a number of channels apart for any listener.
(Few receivers are selective enough to separate strong signals on
adjacent channels.) In HF broadcasting, the long reach of the
signals via sky-wave propagation, combined with the large number
of broadcasters, makes such neat separations almost impossible.
Despite the best ITU coordination of transmitter sites,
frequencies, and beam directions, a listener will often find that
co-channel and adjacent-channel signals are so strong that they
cause interference with the signal that he wants to hear.
Deliberate jamming is usually even stronger for listeners in the
areas at which the jamming is aimed -- it is designed to prevent
the message of the foreign broadcaster from being heard at all.
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The extent of mutual interference among HF broadcasters is
indicated by the results of the ITU coordination process
performed four times yearly. This is available in the ITU
broadcasting schedules document. For each of the thousands of
coordinated program transmissions, calculations are made to
determine those expected to interfere with it and cause a
signal-to-interference ratio of less than 11 dB (a factor of
3.55). On the average, there are about five such interferences
listed in the schedule for every program transmission, with a
range from none to over 20 interferers.
The problem of co-channel and adjacent-channel interference is
compounded by a lack of discipline among world broadcasters --
some of them often operate on frequencies and beam directions
other than the ones submitted to the ITU for coordination. This
often may be a result of trying to find a "quiet" spot. There is
also evidence that the Soviet Union often operates transmitters
carrying internal programming so as to interfere with VOA
programming in ethnic Soviet Union languages. This is jamming,
but they say that it is not -- it is just their internal
broadcasting.
In the immediate post-World-War-II period, when there were fewer
HF broadcasters than today, mutual interference was a minor
problem; satisfactory signals could be delivered with
transmitters of 25-100 kW power. In the 1960's, many HF
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broadcasters, including VOA, began to increase power to the
200-300 kilowatt range; 250 kW was adopted by VOA as a "standard"
for new installations. VOA currently has 56 250-kW transmitters
in operation: twelve at Greenville are arranged in six pairs,
each of which can output either 500 kW or 250 kW (only one output
line to the antenna switch matrix is provided for each pair). In
the last few years, other countries have built 500-kW
transmitters, with 81 now in operation, and another 31 planned or
on order. The VOA currently has no 500-kW transmitters overseas,
but it has requested FY 1983 funds to install four in Sri Lanka
broadcasting to the mid-Asian continent, and is considering
whether 500 kW (or more) should become its new standard.
Because of the vagaries of sky-wave propagation, VOA adopted
another standard years ago: that at least three different
frequencies should be used simultaneously to cover a listening
area the width of one time zone. This is a major factor in the
number of sites and transmitters required to deliver VOA
programming since it requires three transmitters per program.
For additional time zones, VOA standard operating procedure calls
for use of one or two additional transmitters. Thus, to cover
all of the Soviet Union as far East as the Urals, VOA schedules
5-7 transmitters (if available), all carrying the same program.
This number is increased by one transmitter per time zone if the
program is being jammed.
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The following sections discuss VOA's options, and some opinions
expressed by persons interviewed, for improving ground-based HF
signal delivery capability in the coming decades.
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2. HIGH-POWERED TRANSMITTERS.
A world-wide power race is underway in HF transmitters, as we
have noted. In order to keep its signals competitive, VOA has
made plans to go to 500 kW in some or all of its new
installations. Unfortunately, this will have a major impact on
operating costs since electrical power for VOA relay stations is
currently about 50 percent of total site operating expenses. The
Philippines Relay Station, for example, had FY 1982 operating
expenses of $4.1 million (including local employee salaries and
benefits), of which $2.2 million was the cost of power. Initial
capital expense will also be greater for transmitters, and for
500-kW rated antennas, feed lines, and switching matrices.
No U.S. company currently has a production design for HF
transmitters larger than 250 kW. The 500-kW units being acquired
by other countries are made primarily by Brown-Boveri
(Switzerland), Telefunken (West Germany), and Marconi (U.K.). *
All of these transmitters use a new technique called pulse
duration modulation (PDM) which permits an improvement over the
usual 50-55 percent power efficiency of standard transmitters.
PDM performs a second modulation by pulsing the transmitter on
and off at a kilocycle rate sufficiently higher than the 5-kHz
* An additional issue would be the negative effect on U.S.
balance of payments for high-power equipment.
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audio modulation so that it does not degrade the audio. This
creates higher-frequency sidebands that must be filtered out
before transmission to keep the transmitted bandwidth
approximately the same as for standard 5-kHz audio modulation.
But, since the transmitter is not on all the time, it uses less
average power for the same peak power.
We have been unable to get solid information on the power
efficiency of PDM transmitters during this study, and found that
although VOA Engineering had some brochures, they had not had
time to investigate PDM characteristics in any detail. We have
heard efficiency numbers ranging from 60-80 percent from various
sources. Using this spread, a 500-kW transmitter would use
somewhere between 30 and 70 percent more power than a standard
250-kW transmitter, with the number more likely lying between 50
and 70 percent more power. If it is assumed that 80 percent of
the total power usage of a relay station is by transmitter final
amplifiers, then a station with all 500-kW transmitters would use
somewhere between 40 and 56 percent more power than an all-250-kW
station. For the Philippines Relay Station discussed above, this
would be an additional cost of $900,000 to $1,300,000 per year at
current power costs.
We have also encountered a divided opinion as to the wisdom or
necessity of making 500 kW a new VOA standard power. Some point
out that this brings only a 3-dB improvement in signal strength
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at a substantial increase in operating cost and that larger
improvements in signal strength delivered to listeners can be
obtainable at less life-time cost by other means, such as use of
higher-gain antennas or dynamic optimization of sky-wave signal
strength in the listener area. These will be discussed in the
next section.
Others expressed foreboding over the electronic pollution caused
by "super-power" transmitters, and feel that there would be no
necessity for all parties to increase power if the bands were not
so crowded. They suggest that the clearing of the band
extensions adopted at the 1979 WARC should be expedited so that
present stations can begin to spread out. These expansions were
to be phased in after a 10-year waiting period. * Beyond that, it
is felt that consideration should be given in future world radio
conferences to the allocation of more bandwidth for HF
broadcasting, on the basis that long-range broadcasting is a
better use of the special sky-wave propagation characteristics of
the 3-30 MHz spectrum than the many present point-to-point radio
communications services which could be moved to alternate, non-HF
technologies. It should be noted that the present 12 HF
broadcast bands total 3.155 MHz. However, the 8 most useful bands
(5-21 MHz) total only 2.16 MHz, less than one-half the bandwidth
* Many countries other than the U.S. are already operating "out
of band," i.e., in the new extensions, but this is not officially
condoned, and the ITU does not at present coordinate
transmissions in the band extensions.
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of one TV channel, and only 10.8 percent of the 3-30 MHz
spectrum. The 1979 WARC approved band extensions totaling
780 kHz for HF broadcasting (2.9 percent more of the 3-30 MHz
spectrum), but the extensions were not supposed to be used by
broadcasters before 1989, with some not until after the year
2000.
Other people interviewed in the course of this study have cited
the greater design and operational problems of "super-power" HF
transmitters compared to present 250-kW designs. Chief among
these are the higher voltages and currents that must be handled
by the antenna switches, feed lines, and antennas, with much
greater proclivity for arc-overs, burn-outs, and grass fires.
(We were told that the present 500-kW transmitters at Greenville,
North Carolina, have many more outages for this reason than the
smaller transmitters, and that grass fires in the antenna field
are a constant hazard.) The cooling provisions for super-power
designs are also more difficult because more heat loss is
concentrated in a single power amplifier. This is, of course, not
true for coupled designs, such as the present 500-kW transmitters
at Greenville.
One way to obtain higher HF power without the above problems is
to use phased array techniques, in which several separate
transmitters, each driving a separate antenna, produce a single
broadcast beam. The power combining then takes place after the
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signals have left the antennas, and no system element has to
handle the total power. It has been reported to us that a VOA
Engineering study was made a few years ago of the possibilities
for "super-power" stations, and that the conclusion was that the
multi-transmitter, multi-antenna approach was preferable to
having large single transmitters driving single antennas, for the
reasons cited above.
The USAF/General Electric high-power, HF backscatter radar under
experimental test in Maine is an example of the phased array
technique. This is based on developmental work at Stanford
University. (5j In the experimental Maine radar, which presently
operates on frequencies from 6 to 22 MHz (and will be expanded to
cover 5-28 MHz), 12 separate 100-kW transmitters each drive a
separate element in a linear, phased array antenna 2,265 feet in
length; a megawatt fan beam (broad in elevation) is created which
is controllable in both azimuth beamwidth and azimuth direction
by low-power phase-control electronics in the transmitter
exciters. Depending on the frequency, the beam can be as narrow
as a few degrees, and it can be swept through 60 degrees in
azimuth.
(5)
"Backscatter Radar Unit Enters Production Phase," Kenneth J.
Stein, Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 16, 1982, pp
68-69.
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A decision to make 500-kW unit transmitters a new VOA standard
should be made only after a systems study which includes careful
consideration of the advances in signal delivery that could be
made by some combination of:
- innovative changes in the way broadcast beams are
generated
- the dynamic optimization of transmission parameters to
account for actual ionospheric propagation conditions,
and, wherever possible, the expected noise levels in the
most important reception areas
- centralized, real-time network control
These possibilities are expanded upon in the next section.
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3. ANTENNA TECHNOLOGY
With few exceptions, all the antennas at VOA relay stations have
fixed azimuth beam directions and elevation launch angles. They
also generally have rather broad azimuth beams -- 40 to 70
degrees on the lower HF bands, and 20 to 40 degrees on the higher
bands. (Antenna gains are an inverse function of beamwidth, and
range from 15 to 25 dB from the lower to the higher frequencies.)
There is some flexibility in elevation launch angle for
particular broadcasts in that some azimuth directions at some
relay stations have two different launch angles available for
switching (either two different antennas on the same azimuth, or
an antenna that is high-low switchable). Almost half of VOA's
325-odd antennas worldwide are of rhombic design with little or
no possibility of beam controllability, and almost all of the
remainder are of curtain design. Curtains, being an array of
radiating elements, can accommodate beam control through feed
phasing. Most of VOA's curtains, however, are installed to have
fixed azimuth and elevation angles. The few exceptions are a
single two-azimuth curtain at Greenville, North Carolina, Site A
(recently installed for South American service), 14 two-elevation
curtains at Kavala, Greece, and all the curtains at Woofferton,
England, which have both high-low and +/- 12 degree azimuth
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switching. The BBC, however, has indicated that it will exercise
an agreement right to take over VOA's six-transmitter Woofferton
facilities, and wants to do so in 1990. Worldwide, VOA also has
about a dozen low-power antennas of other types (log-periodic,
etc.). Some of these are steerable through 360 degrees.
The choice of antenna beamwidth (and thus antenna gain) is
largely set by the ground area one intends to cover with a single
broadcast at a given distance from the transmitter. It is
apparent that the VOA philosophy has always been to cover fairly
large areas for most broadcasts, thus the installed antenna
characteristics as described above. It has been suggested that
in the face of increased interference from other broadcasters and
jamming, VOA should consider more directive, higher-gain beams if
it wants to break through to certain high-density audiences. The
question might be posed another way: is it better to broadcast to
all of Western USSR for several hours with possibly
non-competitive signals except in rural regions, or to focus
available power on a sequence of smaller, high-population areas
for shorter periods each? If the answer is the latter, then new
types of antennas having more directivity and fast-slew control
of beam directions in small angular increments will be required.
A recent paper suggests that the Soviet Union may have already
adopted the above philosophy. The author of this paper notes the
fact, as has also been commented on by others, that for programs
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directed at North American listeners, Radio Moscow is delivering
a much stronger signal than either the BBC or the Deutsche Welle,
despite the fact that the distance from the Soviet transmitters
is much greater. He postulates that the Soviets are using much
larger curtain antennas than VOA and other free-world
broadcasters (more bays and/or more stacks), and that because of
apparent "tune-up" variations in signal strength at the beginning
of broadcasts, that they are also dynamically optimizing
transmission parameters. (6)
In HF sky-wave transmission, a number of factors determine the
distances away from the transmitter that the signal strikes the
earth on its first, second, and subsequent hops, and the
consequent signal strengths delivered to each location. Chief
among these are the heights of the various ionospheric layers
along the transmission path, their reflection/absorption
characteristics for various frequencies, the transmission
frequency used, and the elevation launch angle and elevation
beamwidth. Only the frequency, the launch angle, and the
elevation beamwidth are under the broadcaster's control -- the
ionospheric parameters for a particular path vary widely over
(6)
"Why Radio Moscow is WINNING the dB WAR," Stanley Leinwall,
Radio-Electronics, December, 1981, pp 55-57.
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each day as the Earth rotates, from season-to-season (with the
Earth's precession), and as a function of solar activity (sun
spots).
VOA has predictions made for the average expected transmission
conditions over future one-month periods for each transmission
path of interest from each of its relay stations (some 200 paths
in all). These predictions are made by NTIA/ITS (Boulder) with
the HFMUFES 4 computer program, which has the frequency bands,
gain patterns, and beam directions of all VOA antennas in its
data base. The result is over 500 pages of printout that list,
at two-hour intervals over the average day, the maximum useable
frequency (MUF) and the lowest usable frequency (LUF). Also
listed for each HF broadcast band at two-hour intervals are
predicted best signal-delivery parameters:
- the particular antenna used for calculation
- the predicted best propagation mode
- the number of hops along the path
- the best elevation launch angle for the mode
- the gain of the antenna at that launch angle
- the estimated delivered signal strength
- the estimated reliability of the mode over the month
Note that the gain of the chosen antenna is automatically reduced
from its maximum beam-center value to account for any angular
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offsets of the beam center from the path azimuth and from the
optimum launch angle for the propagation mode.
The prediction data is used in VOA's four-times-per-year
scheduling process to select which frequencies and antennas
should be used from which relay stations to deliver particular
programs during a broadcasting period. (The four annual periods
are: Sept.-Oct., Nov.-Feb., Mar.-April, and May-August.) Since
proposed schedules are coordinated with the BBC and the Deutsche
Welle before they must be submitted to the ITU six months in
advance of the broadcast period, the prediction data used is run
about eight months in advance. There are opportunities for some
changes in a schedule up to one month before it goes into effect,
but by and large, VOA operations are based on ionospheric
predictions made over a half a year in advance.
We have discussed this situation with a number of knowledgeable
people, and found a difference of opinion. Some feel that the
current HFMUFES program is so good that there is little to be
gained by attempting to dynamically assess the state of the
ionosphere and correct transmission parameters accordingly.
Others say that actual conditions cannot be predicted with great
accuracy that far ahead; and, even if the predictions of average
conditions for a month are good, day-to-day variations from the
average are at least +/- 20 percent. They thus feel that dynamic
correction should have a payoff.
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We have attempted to learn what we could about the backscatter
sounding technique for assessing delivered signal strength and
picking the best of available elevation launch angles.
Experimental measurements made on VOA facilities in 1967 by
Stanford Engineering Laboratories and VOA engineers have been
reported. (7) These tests, made between Greenville, N.C. and a
receiving point in Rolla, Missouri, indicated that backscatter
echos could be used to pick the better of two elevation angles
(high and low) about 80 percent of the time. In some cases, the
signal strength difference in Rolla (a one-hop path) was as much
as 12 dB. VOA apparently made some subsequent operational trials
of backscatter sounding in South American programming, but
without much success in improving its signals into a particular
area of Brazil, and abandoned the technique. (We have been told
that later tests and computer simulations showed that the
difficulty in these trials was not the fault of the backscatter
technique -- the particular area for which signal optimization
was being attempted is in a propagation "hole" for the
transmitter site involved.)
We have also learned from our interviews that RFE/RL used the
backscatter sounding technique extensively for a number of years
(7)
"Elevation Steering of HF Broadcasting Antennas Using Backscatter
Sounding," J. M. Lomasy and R. B. Fenwick, Technical Report IA-5
(SU-SEL-68-031), Stanford Engineering Laboratories, June 1968.
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during the 1970's with good results, but it now feels that the
HFMUFES program predictions are so good that sounding gives
little improvement. RFE/RL have not been using sounding for
several years.
In regard to the VOA and RFE/RL tests and uses of backscatter
sounding mentioned above, we note that neither organization had
antennas with fine control of elevation angle, and could only
choose between two angles -- high (typically 20-26 degrees) and
low (typically 8-10 degrees). The tests and trials may therefore
not have been able to demonstrate the real value of elevation
slewing for best backscatter echo. For example, examination of
typical HFMUFES output data shows that the calculated best
elevation angles for particular paths vary over the range
1-30 degrees depending on the mode, frequency, and time of day.
(8) In making each signal strength prediction, the program
reduces the beam-center antenna gain in accordance with the
angular difference between the launch angle for the best
propagation mode and the physical beam angle of the antenna. In
many cases, the angular difference is a substantial fraction of
the antenna elevation beamwidth, and the resulting antenna gain
in the optimum launch direction is as much as 5-8 dB lower than
its beam-center gain. (The gain used in the computation is made
(8)
"Radio Propagation Predictions of the High-Frequency Broadcasting
Bands," (for December 1981), Frequency Division, VOA.
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even lower if the beam center in azimuth is not pointing directly
at the desired target area.)
The particular high and low angles that have been designed into
VOA's antennas certainly represent prudent compromises if one has
to pick between just two angles. However, if the best launch
angle determined by ionospheric conditions is half-way between,
as it often is, then both the high and low angles will give
approximately the same result, and neither will have full gain in
the best launch direction. The gain loss is as large or larger
than the 3 dB that would be gained by doubling power. The same
loss in gain occurs if the optimum launch angle is near either
end of its 1-30 degree range.
It should also be noted that if, as discussed earlier, it is
desired to raise signal strengths by using beams narrower than
those now used by VOA, gain fall-off due to antenna-beam pointing
errors will be even more severe, and fine-control beam slewing
capability would seem to be a prerequisite to their use.
One propagation specialist consulted noted that in the past it
was thought that the reflection characteristics of the ionosphere
were so dispersive as to preclude an initially narrow beam
staying that way after one or more hops. He said that this is no
longer considered to be true. He feels that the use of narrow
beams to increase delivered signal strengths is quite feasible.
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The sum total of all of the preceding is that there appears to be
the possibility of much larger increases in HF signal strength
delivered to critical audiences through innovations in antenna
technology (including dynamic beam control) than through
increases in transmitter power, and at much less increase in
annual operating costs. We therefore recommend that VOA
thoroughly investigate what is now possible in very large
steerable arrays (including those with phase locked multiple
transmitters) before deciding on 500 kW as a new transmitter
standard. In this regard, we have been told by one maker of HF
antennas that it is probably now possible to build a very large
antenna (8 bays and 8 stacks) that would operate on four
contiguous bands (present VOA curtains operate on no more that
two adjacent bands, e.g., 7/9 Mhz, 9/11 Mhz, etc.). He also says
that the ability to obtain fine control of elevation angle is
contingent on having a very tall antenna (e.g., 8 stacks) that
would generate narrow vertical beams and reduce the effect of the
ground image antenna on the radiated pattern.
As mentioned earlier, VOA programs are not all delivered on
single frequencies from single antennas, or necessarily from a
single relay station (the three transmitters per time zone rule).
If dynamic beam control is instituted, relay stations should no
longer operate independently, each following its own facilities
usage schedule determined at VOA headquarters months earlier, but
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as an interconnected network that can adapt as a whole to the
signal needs of the moment.
Backscatter sounding appears to have sufficient potential for
signal optimization that it should be further investigated in the
context of antennas having finer control of antennas that those
used in VOA and RFE/RL testing to date. It should also be noted
that a number of people have commented that there is an
alternative to backscatter sounding for dynamic signal
optimization -- an expanded monitor network with real-time
feedback to the transmitter sites. More will be said about this
in a later section.
Finally, all of the above addresses only one-half of the problem
of delivering VOA's message to the ears of listeners: i.e.,
transmission. At least one of the persons interviewed, and one
with a good deal of listening experience in the Indo-European
area, said that getting better receiving equipment into the hands
of VOA's audience would have a far greater effect in reducing
interference problems than increases in transmitted power. This
could include receiving antennas with more directivity and
possibly selective discrimination against ground-wave jamming,
and receivers with much better selectivity than present
mass-market types. This and other receiver issues are discussed
later in Section II-B.
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4. MONITORING.
At the present time, VOA has a worldwide monitoring network
consisting of eight full-time stations manned by VOA personnel;
approximately 30 contract listeners, usually U.S. citizens
resident or on stationed temporarily abroad; and about 25
volunteer listeners, short-wave fans who are citizens of various
countries and who have agreed to report on the quality of VOA
reception. Listener reports, submitted on forms provided by VOA,
are processed in Washington to yield an overview of VOA's
performance in delivering its message.
The impression we have gained is that feedback and processing of
listener reports, at least those from non-VOA sources, is a slow,
"see-where-we've-been" process. For example, the listener-report
computer run of May 13, 1982 was for March and April, the
previous broadcast period. This is better than it seems to have
been in the past. A former VOA engineer said that while he was
there a few years ago, listener reports were often stacked up for
six months or more waiting to be computer processed. Personnel
shortages and lack of access to computer facilities were cited as
principal problems.
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A strong suggestion from one interviewee is that VOA should do
much more with monitoring. He suggested that VOA should both
expand its network of full-time monitor stations and institute
real-time reporting. He said that a properly designed monitoring
system could account for the effects of interference -- from
jamming or otherwise -- and, wherever it could be done well and
reliably, could be more effective than backscatter sounding in
optimizing transmission parameters.
Audience correspondence is another potential source of
information on VOA signal effectiveness. The BBC, for example,
places great weight on listeners' views, with a department
dedicated to reading and responding to letters. In 1980, the BBC
handled over 350,000 such letters. It also mailed out
questionaires, receiving 19,000 answers. (9) Our information,
however, is that VOA places little emphasis on responding to
listener letters, and that many go unanswered, or are answered
only after a lengthy delay. Not only is VOA losing an
opportunity to build its image, it is also losing information on
signal performance which could be gleaned from an expanded base
of corresponding listeners.
(9)
BBC Annual Report, 1982.
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5. SITE ISSUES
Under proper ionospheric conditions, HF signals can, and do
propagate strongly half-way around the world. However, due to
the ionosphere's inherent instability, the more times a signal
has to bounce up-and-down between it and the Earth, the less
reliably a signal's propagation can be predicted. Predictions
for one or two hops, and distances of one to two thousand miles,
are fairly predictable, but at longer distances and for more than
two hops, deviations become serious.
Therefore, for reliable worldwide coverage, VOA has wisely
dispersed most of its HF transmitters in ten overseas relay
stations. Direct-broadcast programming from HF transmitters at
Greenville, N.C., and Bethany, Ohio is intended primarily for
listeners in Latin America and parts of Africa. VOA also uses
medium-frequency (MF) transmission from some overseas sites to
provide local ground-wave coverage up to a few hundred miles.
These MF transmitters are in Kavala and Rhodes, Greece; Munich,
West Germany; Bangkok, Thailand; and Botswana. Sites in Florida
and Antigua transmit MF to the Caribbean.
One of the issues facing the VOA is what to do about its four HF
sites in the U.S.: Greenville, North Carolina; Bethany, Ohio; and
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both Delano and Dixon in California. Dixon is currently in
mothballs, having been deactivated in 1979. All VOA programming
is generated in the Washington studios and, except for the
direct-broadcast functions of Greenville and Bethany, the U.S.
sites principally feed VOA programs to overseas relay
transmitters. Now that most primary feeds are by satellite, many
in VOA and USICA feel that the relay functions of the U.S.
transmitters have become superfluous, and a costly luxury to
maintain. Others in VOA have maintained that despite the extra
operating costs, HF transmitter feeds from the U.S. and the HF
receiving facilities at overseas relay stations are vital and
should be kept in constant operation as an instantaneous backup
in case of satellite circuit outages. Some also feel that U.S.
sites need to be maintained, and possibly augmented in
capability, for direct-broadcast duties in case key overseas
sites are lost due to political or other catastrophes.
This question of HF backup for satellite feeds is not a technical
issue as much as a philosophical one. HF-feed capability would
probably not have been built had satellite circuits already been
in use. But, the HF feeds were there first, and there is thus
an element of "status quo" in maintaining HF feeds simply as
backups for satellites. To some extent, this has been fostered
by past unreliable satellite links, primarily the terrestrial
connections maintained by the local telephone authorities. In a
later section, we discuss the technical and political
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probabilities of reducing satellite feed outages to a vanishing
point, removing any need for backup.
The feed question is also related to the broadcast-backup
question. If it is desired to maintain a quick-reaction
capability to back up overseas relay sites with state-side
transmission facilities, all such VOA transmitters must be kept
operationally ready. For high-power radio equipment, this
requires almost daily operation to prevent equipment
deterioration and to maintain a staff familiar with its
operation.
The Dixon relay station illustrates the problem of trying to
bring idled equipment on the air after extended non-operational
periods. Dixon was deactivated in 1979 and placed in caretaker
status. Current VOA plans call for it to be reactivated for
additional Spanish-language programming directed at Central and
South America. But reactivation will not be a simple matter.
The GAO has recently estimated that it will cost $1.5 million to
reactivate Dixon, and that it will take six months just to get
the transmitters operating again. VOA Engineering estimates that
the reactivation cost will be considerably less ($200,000), but
we have not seen their time estimate. Complete station shutdown,
such as Dixon, is an extreme case, but these problems would be
encountered to a lesser degree with idled equipment and reduced
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staff at operating stations. *
Because the distances from the U.S. to VOA's audiences is much
greater than from overseas relay stations, with more ionospheric
hops required, broadcasting directly from the Continental U.S.
could only be done with greatly reduced effectiveness even if
significant improvements were made in present facilities. Under
the best of circumstances, these distances and hops reduce signal
strengths, but also from the U.S. there are fewer hours per day
for "good" transmission than from present overseas sites.
Difficulties of stateside transmission are shown in a comparison
of the December 1981 HFMUFES predictions of transmission to the
Moscow region from Kavala, Greece and from Greenville, N.C. (11)
Figure 1 plots the predicted signal strength range of the best
four frequencies at two-hour intervals from Kavala (top curve)
and from Greenville (bottom curve). Both curves are based on
250-kW transmitters. Signals for the best four Kavaia
frequencies are all 2 millivolts per meter or greater for the
evening hours (5 PM to 9 AM Moscow time), and 1-2 mV/m during the
day (9 AM to 5 PM). Signals for the best Greenville frequencies,
however, are never over 0.5 millivolt per meter, and dip to less
* A further non-technical problem is that if ITU-registered
frequencies are not used at frequent intervals, other
broadcasters begin to pirate them.
(11) VOA, Ibid.
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Fig. 1 Comparison of Predicted Signal Strengths in
Moscow for Kavala and Greenville 250kW
Transmitters, December 1981.
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than half of this in the evening "prime time," 5-11 PM. At 9 PM,
the best Kavala signal (9-MHz band) is 22 dB greater than the
best Greenville signal (21-MHz band), or 12.6 times as strong in
field strength in the reception area. Even at the worst time of
the day for Kavala (1 PM), its best signal is 4.5 times as strong
as the best Greenville signal. Greenville does, of course, have
500-kW transmitters, and these would raise the HFMUFES numbers by
3 dB, a factor of 1.414. * The dashed curve in Fig. 1 is 3 dB
above the strongest Greenville signals -- still far below the
Kavala signals.
If distance were the only factor, Greenville signals would always
be 12.6 dB weaker than Kavala signals, for the same transmitter
parameters, and this is the approximate difference shown in Fig.
I during the hours from midnight to 9 AM. The other relative
variations are the result of changes in ionospheric reflection
efficiency along the respective transmission paths.
Signal strength is not the whole story, however. Reliabilities
predicted for the signal strengths shown are much higher for
Kavala than for Greenville. Only for the 3-7 AM Moscow time
period are the reliabilities approximately equal. In the prime
(Moscow time) evening hours, 5-11 PM, Kavala reliabilities are in
the 98-99 percent range, whereas predicted Greenville
* Note: voltage is proportional to the square root of power.
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reliabilities are in the 60-70 percent range. (A 70 percent
reliability means that the predicted signal strengths would not
be realized 30 percent of the time.)
VOA also uses transmitters in Munich, West Germany; Tangier,
Morocco; and Woofferton (U.K.) to broadcast to the Moscow region.
Munich (100 kW) and Woofferton (250 kW) signal strengths
predicted for Moscow are comparable to those from Kavala, and
provide several frequency choices for each hour of the day with 1
millivolt per meter performance or better. Tangier, being twice
as far away as Kavala and having only 100-kW transmitters at
present, generally delivers signal strengths of 0.5-1 millivolt
per meter, but with a number of reliable frequencies for each
hour of the day.
It can be concluded that if the VOA were to have to abandon the
above sites, and could not obtain satisfactory alternative
overseas sites, its voice in the Soviet Bloc would be much
quieted compared to the present situation, and much more
susceptible to interference and jamming. Were transmission to
originate in the United States, much stronger beams would have to
be generated through a combination of higher antenna gains and
higher power, and dynamic optimization of transmission parameters
would also seem to be required because of the low path
reliabilities cited above. Even so, the service would be degraded
considerably.
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In regard to VOA's future overseas expansion, we have discussed
with various people the strategy of a few new large stations
versus a larger number of smaller stations with a more general
geographic distribution. There was general agreement that the
financial economies of scale favor fewer, larger stations.
Because the cost of building and manning a small station is not
proportionally less than that for a large station, dispersing a
given number of transmitters into a large number of small sites
will cost more in capital and operating expenses than grouping
them into fewer, larger sites. This seems to be true even though
the transmitter equipment needed to provide adequate signal
strengths can be less costly if the small sites are located so
that shorter transmission distances are involved than from the
large stations.
Cost alone should not be the overriding consideration, however.
The larger number of sites, the greater possibilities there are
for being able to direct strong signals to specific areas af the
large land masses of the Euro-Asian and African continents at the
desired times of day. Beaming into Soviet-bloc nations from a
larger number of directions can also help in regard to jamming,
particularly of the sky-wave type. Also, the larger the number
of stations, the less will be the effect of losing any particular
site or sites due to political causes.
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Therefore, in conclusion, there is a complex set of relationships
among transmitter sizes and locations. As the VOA plans how to
cope with the increased strengths and growing number of competing
broadcast signals, with jamming, and with the possible loss of
certain sites, it should certainly conduct trade-off studies
which include cost-effectiveness analyses of various siting
strategies, and the vulnerability issue. We discuss some of the
political factors in Section II-C.
A final consideration regarding sites: one suggestion from
someone quite knowledgeable in HF antenna design is that locating
antennas on cliff edges would remove the effect of the normal
ground image, making fine control of elevation angle more
feasible. This could also help in achieving the very low launch
angles that are optimum for some propagation modes.
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6. JAMMING CONSIDERATIONS
After a hiatus of seven years, the USSR resumed jamming of VOA
broadcasts to the Soviet bloc in August, 1980. Current jamming
of VOA, RFE/RL, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Kol Israel, and Radio Peking
transmissions to Soviet-bloc countries is extensive. Both
sky-wave jamming for distant areas and ground-wave jammers for
local, metropolitan areas are used by the Soviets.
Sky-wave jamming does not impede reception just within the
Soviet-bloc countries; it affects areas far from the USSR. A
March, 1982 survey indicates that a large percentage of all
channels in the 7-, 9-, 11-, 15-, and 17-MHz bands are
essentially useless in the evening hours, 1700-2300 local time in
the locations indicated: (13)








[These numbers are averaged from hour-by-hour percentages given
in the reference for each band. Excluding Washington, the raw
data spread indicates from 26 to 86 percent useless channels for
particular band-hour-site combinations.)
(13) "A Study of the Impact of Jamming on the H.F. Broadcasting
Bands" (undated VOA document, based on March 22/23, 1982
monitoring).
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This deliberate negation of half of the most useful short-wave
channels represents a worldwide problem that will no doubt be a
major issue at the upcoming ITU short-wave conferences in 1984
and 1986. One person that is very much involved in frequency
coordination and past conferences said that he did not see how
the 1984 conference could succeed if jamming continues as at
present.
Sky-wave jamming signals from a given transmitter are subject to
the same propagation conditions as sky-wave broadcast signals;
such jamming signals only strike the ground at intervals called
the skip distance, leaving zones of relatively small signal
strength in between. Unless these skip zones are jammed by other
sky-wave transmitters in different locations, or by local
ground-wave jammers, sky-wave broadcasts can reach into these
"quiet" zones with a signal strength advantage over the jamming.
There is also a phenomenon called "twilight immunity." As the
ionosphere (particularly the F layer) changes from its day height
to its lower night height in a given locale, it has a slope
downwards from West to East. During this time, the higher HF
frequencies will propagate from West to East, but not from East
to West. This is already exploited by VOA in its broadcasts to
the Soviet satellite states and Western USSR; frequencies are
chosen which the Soviets cannot jam during twilight immunity with
sky-waves transmitted from the interior of the USSR.
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Except during the times of twilight immunity, the same
propagation conditions prevail for both jammers and broadcasters.
If both are assumed to be one-hop paths, the jammer has to have a
substantial fraction of the broadcaster's power in order to make
the broadcaster's message completely unintelligible to dedicated
listeners willing to put up with very noisy signals. Increasing
broadcast signal strengths therefore forces jammers to increase
the jamming signal. We were unable to determine whether VOA's
current goal of 2.5 millivolts per meter for jammed broadcasts is
sufficient to ensure intelligibility in areas subject only to
sky-wave jamming. Several interviewees only suggested that
signals should be as strong as possible. Examination of the
HFMUFES printouts indicate that predicted signal strengths into
the Moscow region are often in the range 2-2.5 mV/m from stations
such as Kavala (see Fig. 1) and from Woofferton, but not higher.
The BBC and the Deutsche Welle coverage standards are lower. (14)
The BBC strives to achieve 1 mV/m, 90 percent of the time, and
recognizes that this is usually not possible for the longer
distances. It feels that 2.5 mV/m is generally impossible to
achieve with its present sites and equipment. The Deutsche Welle
strives to achieve 0.5-1 mV/m, but says that its signals are
sometimes as low as 0.1 mV/m. This is a level of 40 dBu (40 dB
above 1 microvolt/meter).
(14)
"Technical Standards," Memorandum from Anna L. Case (VOA/EF) to
William H. Read, May 3, 1982.
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Ground-wave jamming propagates only in the vicinity of the
transmitter, in a manner similar to MF or TV broadcast signals.
It thus has the advantage of short distances from the
transmitter, but the signal rapidly loses strength through
absorption of energy by the ground. None-the-less, signal
strengths much stronger than sky-wave signals can be generated in
a local area tens of miles in radius. The possibility of
breaking through such jamming in metropolitan Soviet-bloc areas
having numerous ground-wave jammers is not very great, even with
skywave broadcast signals stronger than VOA can now deliver. The
Soviets would have to make an enormous effort, however, to
"protect" their entire population with ground-wave jammers
because of the large areas involved. Thus large parts of their
populace will be subject only to sky-wave jamming.
The best solution to ground-wave jamming lies at the receiver:
very selective (narrow pass band) tuning, radio frequency gain
control to prevent overloading by strong signals, adjustable
rejection filters, etc. (features not often available in present
mass-market receivers); and use of directional antennas. In the
latter regard, Professor O. G. Villard, Jr. of Stanford
University has informed us that he has just devised and tested an
antenna that will selectively discriminate against ground-wave
signals in favor of sky-wave signals. This uses the phenomenom
that signals of any initial polarization become vertically
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polarized as they travel outward from the transmitter along the
ground. (In fact, a true ground-wave signal is vertically
polarized.) HF signals reflected from the ionosphere, however,
almost always contain components of either polarization, no
matter what the polarization at the transmitter. Thus it is
possible to build an antenna insensitive to vertically-polarized
energy (e.g., ground-wave jamming), while maintaining full
sensitivity to downcoming skywave signals. Prof. Villard said
that he has made trials of an experimental antenna on the
Citizens Band (27 MHz). The results were that local signals were
reduced by roughly 20 dB, but distant (skip) signals from sources
hundreds of miles away were reduced hardly at all. Further
development would undoubtedly give even better results.
The antenna is basically a horizontal loop mounted about a foot
above a ground plane, and can be as small as five feet in
diameter. In construction, it is a scaled-up-in-size "conformal
microstrip" antenna of the type recently developed for
applications at microwave frequencies.
Professor Villard feels that the approach may have real promise
for anti-jamming use, and plans to bring it to VOA's attention in
the near future. How VOA might make use of such an antenna is
discussed in the next section.
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B. RECEIVERS
Most suggestions for delivering stronger and higher-quality HF
broadcast signals necessarily address transmission alternatives.
While the U. S. Government may control the number and kind of
transmitters it builds, it cannot control the receivers the
audience uses. But it would be a mistake to assume that the kind
people use is a given factor for all time. While we must avoid
wishful thinking, i.e., designing transmission systems for
receivers and antennas that are not there, it is equally a
mistake to neglect the substantial margin of influence the U.S.
can have on the kinds of receiving equipment people around the
world may be buying five years or more from now.
Present HF receivers are expensive and somewhat complicated to
use. Information on antenna use and construction is generally in
the province of the radio aficionado, as is access to programming
data. Shortwave receivers for the popular market range in price
from about $50 for handheld, insensitive, limited-band portables
that will receive only strong signals having minimal
adjacent-channel interference, to hundreds of dollars for more
capable all-band versions. Professional models are priced into
the thousands of dollars. Clearly, even the lowest price range is
out of the grasp of many third-world households. These costs act
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as a limitation on HF listening. Also, as high-priced equipment,
some HF receivers are sold as consumer packages with portable
stereo tape decks and FM radios, carrying with them their own
competition for the shortwave listening audience. And at the
price range of a good shortwave receiver, many of the emerging
affluent will opt for a television receiver before buying a
shortwave receiver.
Medium-wave (AM) and some FM radios, on the other hand, are
inexpensive enough for even many poorer listeners. Even
good-quality television receivers are relatively equal in cost
to a good shortwave radio, and the used market for television
receivers is much larger than for HF radios. What is needed is a
shortwave receiver in the AM/FM price range which also is
effective in capturing weak signals in the cluttered HF bands
with reasonable sound fidelity. This may be a contradiction, but
some effort should be made to define the problem more clearly.
The main reason that good shortwave receivers are presently
expensive has to do with the circuitry necessary to select from
among strong signals having much smaller frequency separations
than occur in the AM and FM broadcast bands. In the ITU HF
broadcast scheduling process, stations may choose frequencies at
5-kHz intervals, thus the +5-kHz modulation sidebands of
adjacent-channel stations actually overlap. While such frequency
assignments are normally geographically separated to minimize
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interference, the long reach of HF signals via ionospheric
propagation means that a listener trying to hear a particular
signal often finds that it is sandwiched between interfering
signals that may be of equal or greater strength, and
insufficiently separated in frequency to be excluded by the
normal +5-kHz receiver passband. The better, medium-price HF
receivers thus are designed with narrower passbands -- +2.5 kHz
being typical. The high-priced professional receivers have a
number of selectable bandwidths (down to as little as 0.5 kHz for
code reception), and may also have tuneable interference
rejection (notch) filters.
Figure 2 illustrates the passbands of two typical popular-price
HF receivers sold by the Tandy Corporation under the Realistic
label. The DX-200 model ($299) has a signal rejection of 6 dB
(2:1) at 4 kHz off-frequency, whereas the more expensive DX-302
model ($399) has selectable rejections of either 12 dB (4:1) or
60 dB (1000:1) at the same offset frequency. Although the
narrowest passband of the DX-302 will effectively eliminate all
audio frequencies above about 3 kHz, limiting fidelity to
somewhat less than that of a telephone circuit, it will permit
understanding of a broadcast that would be badly garbled by
adjacent-channel signals if the passband were as wide as that of
the less-expensive DX-200 model.
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DX-200 - - 150 kHz to 30 MHz, Dial Tuning, $229
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Fig. 2 Selectivity Curves for Shortwave Receivers Sold by the
Radio Shack Corporation (Realistic Label)
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In addition to a high degree of selectivity, other needed
attributes of good HF receivers are a better sensitivity than is
required for AM/FM receivers, more precise tuning control, and
better frequency stability (the latter two are necessitated by
the narrow passbands). All of these have been made easier to
achieve with the new-technology developments of the past few
years (digital frequency synthesis, SAW filters, microprocessor
control, etc.), but to date these have appeared only in receivers
priced at $400 and upwards. The U. S. Government could sponsor
research and development for the design of superior shortwave
radios that could be economically produced, along the recent
model of the F.C.C.'s funding of research on improved UHF
television tuners. This could be a major influence on the
development of international broadcasting, would enhance the
nation's and VOA's image and credibility worldwide, and might
even spin off a U.S.-based manufacturing industry for shortwave
receivers.
Another effort with a potentially high payback for international
broadcasting might be to develop inexpensive antennas optimized
for certain bands, or HF channels. Highly directional antennas
(and, for some areas subject to jamming, with a sharp null
capability) would aid in receiving signals in areas of weak field
strength; perhaps these could be made to rotate, or some system
of phased reception used for non-movable direction changing, to
compensate for their size. In urbanized areas, or even villages,
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community antennas may be a viable alternative. It may be that
such antennas could be constructed from inexpensive materials
locally available, and VOA could distribute a set of
instructions, or a simple-to-assemble kit. It may be
cost-effective for such items to be distributed free or under
subsidization by the U.S. Government; perhaps even the
inexpensive radios could be so disseminated. This could be a
more effective use of Federal funds than investment in
transmitter equipment.
The possibilities for selling or otherwise distributing improved
reception equipment in the USSR and Soviet-bloc countries are, of
course, quite limited, but dissemination of construction
information by various means may be feasible. Examination of
several 1982 issues of the Soviet popular magazine Radio
indicates that there is a broad-based capability for home
construction of quite sophisticated radio equipment. The issues
contain, for example, detailed plans and instructions for
construction of antennas and receivers for television
(48-610 MHz) and satellite (1215 MHz) signals. Information about
the HF antenna being developed by Professor Villard that
discriminates against ground-wave jamming (see preceding section)
would be an obvious candidate in this regard.
There are some other options available to improve and increase
shortwave listening. Manufacturers of HF receivers could be
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encouraged to take a leaf from the marketing of hi-fi and video
components, and make available several add-on items that a
listener buys as he can afford them. For example, attractive
components now being introduced for the more affluent are video
tape recorders with programmable, timer-controlled TV tuners that
permit unattended recording, over periods as long as a week, of
up to eight hours of desired TV programs for later viewing. Some
of the current generation of videotape devices even make
provisions for storing digital, stereo sound for similar lengths
of time. Today, very few consumer radios with tape decks even
come equipped with a clock, much less a programmable tuner.
Several very expensive, professional-model shortwave receivers
having microprocessor-controlled tuning already have built-in
timers and pre-programming capability. (15) We have not,
however, seen or heard of any that make provision for automatic
recording of pre-selected broadcasts for delayed listening. It
would be a relatively simple matter in these receivers to add a
recording capability; either the ability to control the recording
of the selected programs on a separate audio cassette recorder,
or to build in a cassette deck, as is now common in AM/FM
portable radios. The challenge is to have this capability for at
least medium-price HF receivers, and hopefully the inexpensive
ones as well.
(15) "WRTH Tests Premium Receivers," L. Magne, World Radio TV
Handbook, BILLBOARD A.G., Vol. 36, 1982, pp 551-572.
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Some sort of programmable recording capability like this for
popular-price shortwave radios could improve the opportunities
for HF in radio listening around the world. Its impact on
international broadcasting could be striking where time zones and
ionospheric variations make scheduling for live listening very
difficult. We discuss a more long-range strategy for delayed HF
broadcasting reception dealing with digital electronics in
Section IV-B-3.
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C. POLITICAL ISSUES.
The quality of signal to which people will listen is a function
of their motivation. If they are listening for recreation they
will choose VOA only if the signal is good. If they are
listening in intense fear in a major crisis, they will struggle
to decipher the words in very poor signals. Year in and year out,
however, VOA will have little impact without a good signal.
VOA has an investment of about one billion dollars in 16 sites
around the world for transmission, and for relaying of HF and
some MW signals. These sites have been an optimized compromise
between engineering considerations and political requirements.
Some critical areas of the world have yet to be serviced, and VOA
has embarked on a construction program to alleviate these
deficiencies as well as possible.
REDUNDANCY
The simple fact about site planning is that all the overseas
sites are vulnerable to political changes, and all the sites are
somewhat vulnerable to sabotage. The former problem can only be
mediated through negotiation with host countries, usually at some
monetary and political cost. Both problems are substantially
reduced if VOA has back-up transmission sites, redundant and
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steerable relay facilities, and a set of workable contingency
plans. Even satellite transmission -- for relaying or direct
broadcast -- is not a perfect panacea since somewhere a ground
station is necessary. Also, while satellites are much freer from
political and sabotage threats than ground facilities, they are
not invulnerable to determined physical attack by a major power
having both the desire and the means to do so.
This means that standby capacity has to be kept in working order
at some cost greater than in a no-risk environment such as faced
by ordinary commercial broadcasters. Admittedly, during times of
budget constraint, this is a difficult cost to justify, but it
must be approached from the point of national security, not from
a direct broadcasting benefit-cost viewpoint. And, maintaining
such redundant facilities means more than a capital investment in
mothballed equipment; the facilities must be used in some
meaningful and regular fashion so that experience is maintained
by personnel, bugs are ironed out, and flexibility to crisis
responses is kept in readiness. That is not a simple logistical
task.
RELAY SITES
Given America's location, oceans away from audiences in Europe,
Asia or Africa, direct short wave broadcasting from
U.S. territory requires very high-power transmitters; these are
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bound to be limited in number because of cost. Also, as we have
noted in Section II-B, reception would not be very good because
of propagation difficulties. None-the-less, we must face the
reality that relay sites in other countries may be denied us at
any time, and in a period of tension, with short notice. It is
obviously important to the U.S. to have some such transmitters to
reach very high priority audiences in the Eastern hemisphere, as
well as audiences in the Western hemisphere.
We do not base our case on the argument of pessimists who for
years have been saying that the overseas relay sites were likely
to be closed down. On the whole, friendly countries are willing
to allow rental of retransmission sites for reciprocal
considerations in money or favors. Among the favors are the
ability to use the sites for their own broadcasting during
certain hours when we are not using them. There are some
countries that see leasing of real estate for transmission
purposes as a good business and are willing to lease to any
country without political preference. However, one should not
underestimate the risk involved in reliance on overseas
retransmission sites and the difficulty of getting them in
desirable locations.
For one thing, like a military base, a transmitter site is a
hostage to changing political climates. It is a large investment
and, once it is in place, getting rights renewed and leases
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renegotiated puts this country in a position where there is
something we want badly and for which we may have to bargain. It
is, therefore, desirable to always have an alternative that our
opposite numbers know about, even if it is not quite as good as
the desired remote relay site. Besides that, we must take account
of the possible sudden loss of an important site, either by
revolution, war, or panic of the host country in a crisis.
None-the-less, having a substantial number of well distributed
relay sites of great importance. They- permit medium wave
broadcasting along with short wave. This is very important right
now in the Middle East and for Eastern Europe. Also, more relay
sites permit broadcasting from a variety of directions to jammed
areas, greatly increasing the odds that some of the transmissions
will get through. Relying to any important extent on
transmissions from the Western Hemisphere would be a serious
mistake.
We have discussed some technical issues involved in having a
large number of diverse transmission sites in Sections II-A and
II-B. These issues include the possibility and desirability of
low-manned or unmanned stations, the trade off of numerous small
transmitters vs. a few very large ones, and the possibility
(unfortunately not great) of transmission from other points on
the compass.
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The best strategy for VOA to pursue might be a mix of redundant
transmitters, including high-powered facilities on U.S.
territory, redundant feeders with backup, pre-recorded
programming, and continuing involvement of the host countries in
some aspect of VOA operations or facilities so that some
community of interest is fostered in maintaining VOA continuity.
This latter point will be discussed later in some longer-term
political concepts for the evolution of international
broadcasting.
Since retransmission sites and frequencies for international
broadcasting are important for this country, those who have
responsibility for negotiating leases for transmitter sites
abroad and frequencies in the ITU must appreciate the high
priority that these have for the country. In a situation in
which foreign relations are very multi-dimensional, too often we
find transmitter site negotiators and U.S. representatives at
radio conferences failing to give adequate weight to the
importance of broadcasting facilities for this country. This is
not surprising. Those who conduct such negotiations cannot be
specialists. They will give full weight to VOA needs only if
their instructions from top levels so require.
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III. JAMMING
As long as jamming continues, there is no panacea for overcoming
it. Although there are technical ways to reduce its
effectiveness, and to make it more expensive and unattractive to
the USSR to maintain a given level of "protection" for its
citizens, many Soviet listeners will still be unable to hear
foreign broadcasts that their government does not want them to
listen to. Political means to encourage the Soviets to reduce or
conceivably eliminate jamming would be a better solution.
Jamming is not costless to the USSR. In terms of manpower,
equipment, and electrical power, they probably spend more to jam
than the broadcasters do to transmit the programs they are
jamming, and there are also other costs. Unless they are very
careful, it creates noise and interference with their own
programming, annoys their own population, and hurts their
credibility at home and abroad. It also creates interference far
across the Soviet frontiers, thus bothering other broadcasters
besides the ones they wish to jam, and alienating listeners over
a wide area of the world. But the Soviet regime is so intensely
fearful of the diffusion of information to their population that
there is no reason to expect them to abandon jamming completely,
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no matter what the cost of keeping it up, until there have been
major changes in the overall world situation.
In Section II-B-6, we discussed the extent to which American
transmissions can be given greater effectiveness in penetrating
jamming. This can be done, in part by increasing the radiated
power of U.S. transmitters, but even more effective than that, it
can be done by increasing the number of different beams coming
from different locations and by controlling the focusing of those
beams. As was noted in Section II-B, getting improved reception
equipment into the hands of listeners would also be of great help
if this could be effected to any great extent.
But purely technical fixes at best only somewhat ameliorate the
jamming problem and increase the incentives for the Soviet to
consider a less tractable position. The question remains as to
whether there may be political ways to persuade the Soviets to
abandon or reduce jamming.
Our informants were not optimistic on this score. In general, the
feeling was that it will be difficult to negotiate more
permissive policies with the Soviet government unless they
perceive some prospect of reciprocity. One person interviewed was
quite emphatic that countries outside the Soviet bloc will get
nowhere by simply demanding that jamming be stopped; and that
they must therefore have a bargaining point, i.e., something in
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the full range of inter-government relations that is of value to
the Soviets and that can be given up, if necessary, to gain
access to Soviet-bloc listeners. He felt that if the U.S.
government really wants jamming stopped, or at least reduced,
that it should first identify one or more such bargaining points,
enlist the aid of as many countries as possible, and then enter
serious negotiations.
The prospect of improved penetration by American broadcasts, even
if in ways that could eventually be overtaken by greater Soviet
efforts at jamming, may therefore be of substantial value. For
example, if we can show our determination to raise the cost to
the Soviets of jamming sufficiently by a well-developed plan to
increase the number and the strength of beams directed at the
USSR, they may be willing to back off on jamming. Or the possible
tradeoff may be in some other area of dispute between the U.S.
and the USSR.
It is neither hopeless nor easy to get other countries to help us
persuade the Soviets to refrain from their present illegal
efforts at jamming foreign broadcasts. It is not a high priority
matter for most countries. Relatively few of the ones that are
doing international broadcasting regard the Soviet population as
a priority audience; more often they are anxious to reach their
immediate neighbors in their own region. Furthermore it is not
always clear to most listeners and politicians in the areas of
MIT Research Program on Communications Policy
VOA - FINAL REPORT 25 April, 1983
III. Jamming Page 75
the world not adjacent to the USSR that the noise heard on
shortwave bands is from Soviet jamming equipment. If they think
about jamming at all, they are likely to think that this is
simply a squabble among the superpowers. Only their technicians
are likely to realize that the Soviet jamming is in fact
polluting the shortwave spectrum throughout much of the world and
depriving other countries, including Third World countries, of
the possibility of broadcasting cheaply and easily.
The U.S. in its communication efforts should seek to familiarize
political leaders as well as technical people in other countries
with the fact that about 50 percent of the worlds HF broadcast
spectrum is being made unusable by Soviet jamming, as we pointed
out in Sections II-A-6 and II-B-6.
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IV. FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
As television and recorded audio/video material replace radio as
the normal leisure time activity, as cable systems become
widespread, and as direct satellite broadcasting comes into use,
the methods by which international communications take place will
change significantly. While the improvement of its conventional
short wave transmission capability should be the prime objective
for the next few years, now is also the time VOA should start
planning for future alternatives, for several reasons:
1) To gain a greater share of the international
audience, with a marginal investment, by exploiting
other media to deliver its existing audio programming.
2) To develop new audiences among groups important to
United States foreign policy who today are not attuned
to HF broadcasting for information, or who are not even
oriented to the audio medium.
3) As a contingency backup in the event of a partial or
complete blackout of HF spectrum due to jamming or
coordinated attacks on VOA's physical broadcast plant
and feeds.
4) In preparation for the emergence of new modes of
international communications that may displace HF
listening in the course of the communications
revolution.
There are many possible technological alternatives for
"broadcasting" to present and new audiences, and in different
media, though each technology will have its own level of costs,
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complexity and difficulties. These problems and opportunities
must be weighed against the conventional HF mode to determine if
the effects of substitution or reinforcement are justifiable. We
divide the alternatives into short-range possibilities available
within the decade, and longer-range potential technologies, which
by their very nature require more detailed strategic planning,
and are more problematical in their effects and availability. In
the latter case, as we have noted, U.S. policy initiatives could
be instrumental in bringing new media into general use, affecting
how they are used, and their audience. The possibilities
presented here are:
A. Short Term
1. Local Delivery Systems
2. Cassette Tape Systems
B. Preparing for the Long-Term Future
1. Advanced Systems
2. Digital Storage
3. Advanced Microprocessor and Timer-Tuner Sets
4. Direct Satellite Broadcasting
5. An International Common Carrier
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A. SHORT TERM
1. LOCAL AUDIO DELIVERY SYSTEMS.
In this category we include standard FM, Medium Wave, and the
audio channels potentially available in cable television systems.
FM and CATV will be of growing influence in urbanized regions in
many foreign countries. Already, U.S. satellite feeds are being
tapped by Caribbean and Central American cities for private CATV
systems feeding hotels and residential complexes; this pattern
can be expected to expand. VOA should consider various
alternatives of distributing programming on these outlets.
One possibility could be to provide programming via satellite or
tape to local originators. There is a large increase in the
demand for both radio and TV programming in many countries. When
CATV is introduced, new channels need to be filled; some of this
programming could be VOA audio. In many countries local and
private radio stations are increasing in number. System owners
will be seeking material to fill channels; they may even buy
material. On the other hand, in other places artificial
constraints may be introduced to keep scarcity of channels at a
level where VOA might have to buy or negotiate for access.
Extensive increase of local broadcasting channels and the wiring
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of urban areas for audio or video will otherwise tend to dilute
VOA's HF audience by providing the listeners with increased
alternatives. VOA must respond to this situation by providing
its material to such new systems. In any case, increased efforts
should be put into distribution of audio and videotapes to
broadcasters and cablecasters, and also into direct feeds to them
for re-distribution. (16)
It should be noted that the BBC already has established itself in
the U.S. television market by providing pay-video on
cable/satellite outlets, and by providing its audio news
broadcasts, via satellite and delayed taping, to National Public
Radio. If nothing else, this has increased the BBC's audience in
the U.S. by a quantum jump as well as delivering its signal with
greater fidelity and strength than via HF broadcasting direct
from London or via its relay in Nassau. *
(16) See National Public Radio, Listeninq to the Future: Cable
Audio in the 80s (1982); and Pool and Solomon, "The Future of
Audio Broadcasting in the United States", Telecommunications
Policy, September 1981.
* RFE/RL is negotiating with Belgian CATV for use of some of
their material for audio broadcasting.
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2. CASSETTE TAPE SYSTEMS.
There has been an enormous expansion in the availability and use
of cassette audiotapes in recent years. Recorders are pervasive
throughout the world, even in developing countries; indeed, even
the Iranian revolution has been partly ascribed to their use.
VOA already makes its programming available to other
broadcasters, educational outlets, and others via tape and
cassette. It should be recognized that storage media, such as
digital tape and memory chips, are undergoing a revolution as
radical as that found in other area of communications which in
the next five years may make audio cassettes an important outlet
for VOA, both for broadcast and for the public directly.
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B. PREPARING FOR THE LONG-TERM FUTURE.
In the past, VOA's audience has been relatively easy to pinpoint,
though in some cases extremely difficult to reach. But in coming
decades the precise audiences to be reached will become difficult
to predict as world conditions move from one crisis to the next.
This is all the more reason for VOA to remain fluid in its use of
technology, and in maintaining as broad a base of broadcast
facilities as it can muster. For most of its existence VOA has
had two important audiences: the Third World and the Soviet bloc.
In both of these, for different reasons, domestic news media
serve their publics inadequately. The principal content of VOA
has been news, education and to some extent efforts to counter
disinformation from non-friendly countries. In addition, a third
general audience now requires VOA's attention: both in our Allied
nations, and in developing, neutral, and oil-rich nations, there
are large and growing sophisticated technological elites whose
attitudes affect this country greatly, and who will seek out
high-quality information services.
The importance of all of these audiences and these goals are
growing for HF broadcasters, but more important, modern
electronic communications techniques have begun to outstrip the
capabilities of conventional short-wave broadcasting in
delivering these messages.
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1. ADVANCED SYSTEMS.
While cable television gets most of the attention, other types of
wireline technology for audio must be considered since audio
could be relatively simple to piggyback on other systems such as
digital telephone and video networks. (18) This is an
opportunity for audio where those cable systems offering this
service have tended simply to rebroadcast standard FM stations
for pickup on FM tuners. With proper lead-time, VOA could help
orient the evolution of such complex, integrated service in some
regions. There are no accepted national, not to mention
international, equipment standards for such systems as yet, but
intensive efforts are under way to create such standards.
New devices will be designed and marketed which may permit access
to hundreds of wireline audio channels. These devices may also
be able to access data and text similar to an idea we discuss
later in this section for novel HF receiver technology. National
Public Radio is beginning an experiment using the FM subcarriers
on some of their outlets with some of these features which will
permit the subscriber to program audio programs in advance.
(18) National Public Radio, ibid., and Pool & Solomon, ibid.
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Such developments are likely to occur first in the United States,
Western Europe and Japan. Encouraging their subsequent adoption
elsewhere not only facilitates the free flow of information, but
also may offer markets for American equipment manufacturers. A
variation of these ideas is to use the audio portion of UHF
television channels for delivery of radio programs where channel
space is available. One possibility is to deliver the signal
directly from satellites, as will be discussed under DSB in
Section IV-B-4; another is to subdivide one or two UHF video
channels for audio. Thirty or forty FM, high-fidelity signals
could be transmitted on an 8 megahertz television channel, the
standard for most of the world other than the U. S. and Japan.
With lower fidelity, one hundred or more audio channels would be
possible. Though new equipment would be required, and this
concept transcends the short-range potential, it could be worth
keeping in mind at the next WARC and RARC international
conferences concerned with UHF and video spectrum.
MIT Research Program on Communications Policy
VOA - FINAL REPORT 25 April, 1983
IV B. Long-Term Possibilities Page 84
2. DIGITAL STORAGE.
Digital storage techniques are permitting cost reductions for
duplication and higher quality sound. Use of videodisks and
videotape for audio or mixed audio and animated stills is another
possibility. Videodisks hold much promise for educational
programming because of the inherent cababilities of random access
and cheap reproduction, as well as their virtual
indestructibility. Standards for these systems are one obstacle
to their current widespread use; VOA may be able to help resolve
such issues by getting involved in their use and in developing
worldwide standards during this formative period. Another
similar technology may be the forthcoming digital audio disks
which holds even greater promise for inexpensive quality
reproduction of sound.
Such storage media will not be able to replace VOA's timely news
service, but variations could be a supplement to such activities.
The VOA telecommunications net could be used to reproduce such
media remotely and perhaps with some degree of timeliness.
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3. ADVANCED MICROPROCESSOR AND TIMER-TUNER SETS.
Described below are a number of ideas that might be termed "far
out," but are still within the realm of possibilities. We do not
suggest any short-run commitment to any such far-out ideas. We
raise them because the VOA planning personnel should be actively
aware of all these possibilities (and others mentioned elsewhere
herein) so as to ensure that as appropriate situations arise they
are prepared to take advantage of them, and also so that they can
speak up for VOA needs in U.S. Government planning and R&D
activities.
Because of the large bandwidth required for full motion video and
the political views held by many governments, we do not
anticipate that the strong resistance to international direct
television broadcasts will be overcome soon to the extent that
will allow a TV-DSB-VOA. However, some consideration should be
given to the possibility of narrower bandwidth being available
for still-frame video use in international broadcasting.
We discussed the possibility for combining timers with tuners, as
is now done with video tape recorders in Section II-B,
"Receivers". However, these concepts could be extended during
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the long-term towards other non-conventional concepts for
receiver technology.
For instance, in the longer-term future, it may be possible to
combine the demand for stereo cassette portables or for
television component systems with a special radio tuner capable
of receiving intercontinental signals. The portion of the
spectrum to be used may not even be in the HF band, but perhaps
in the UHF band, with signals transmitted from satellites. If
such transmissions include visuals as well as audio, this could
be part of international videotext transmissions, making maximum
use of an enhanced television receiver. VOA may well be able to
stimulate use of such new technologies, if it coordinates with
consumer electronics manufacturers, and with our allies in
international broadcasting.
While the short-term strategy for enhanced listening might be to
encourage programmable timers on short-wave cassette tape decks
as we note in Section II-B, our imagination should not stop
there. Low-cost digital storage devices and programmable,
pre-tuned digital tuners could be developed using VLSI
microprocessor technology. Such a device would be flexible
enough to capture transmissions at optimum times for later
playback at the listeners' convenience. Eventually, these devices
might cost less than current videotape/audio devices, and less
than the cost of portable stereo tape decks.
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Intelligent devices could receive coded textual information for
display on video screens in different languages. The teaching
potential of such a method of delivering information would be
very great. Also digital broadcasting, or some other appropriate
modulation scheme which does not interfere with existing uses
could be introduced as part of these new standards. There
already are European plans for new enhanced video transmission,
including four-channel digital audio, in connection with the
direct-broadcast satellites to be launched in the next few years.
If VOA helped set the technical standards for such novel
international telecommunications systems the United States could
have an enormous advantage in the long-run.
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4. DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING
The most important long-run possibility for VOA is satellite
broadcasting of radio signals direct to home receivers
(radio-DSB). The importance of planning for this now is that the
decisions made in the ITU's World Administrative Radio
Conferences during next few years will determine whether or not
international radio satellite broadcasting will be permitted
during perhaps the next quarter of a century. It is essential
that U.S. government delegations to those conferences know what
it is that our broadcasters will want to do.
The 26-MHz band has been considered for radio-DSB use in several
recent studies because it is already allocated for international
broadcasting, is underutilized, and is at a high enough frequency
that space antennas, while necessarily quite large, seem
feasible. (19) There is a problem, however, of a lack of 26-MHz
receivers in place worldwide, as will be discussed in Section
V-3. As long as new receivers are going to have to be obtained by
listeners for radio-DSB, they could just as well be for other
frequencies.
(19) Rogers, T. F., "Modernizing and Expanding International
High-Frequency Broadcasting," privately circulated paper,
January, 1982; also Phillips, G. J., and Knight, P., "Use of the
26-MHz Band for Satellite Broadcasting," E.B.U.
Review-Technical Part, August, 1978, pp. 173-178.
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A proposal that has been made in ITU discussions, and supported
by a number of Third World countries, would create a new and very
valuable channel of international communication. That proposal
is that some bands of UHF be allocated to satellite broadcasting.
Most of the use would certainly be for TV, and that is almost
bound to be largely national and largely redistribution. TV uses
so much bandwidth that the number of UHF satellite TV channels
would be small, and in general they would be used up by countries
wishing to beam programming to their own territory. While the
United States rightly refuses to agree to any principle of prior
consent for satellite TV, practicalities make it unlikely that
many clear channels would exist for it. Radio broadcasting is
another story. If some of the UHF Direct Satellite Broadcasting
(DSB) spectrum were used for radio rather than TV, 50 to 100
radio channels could easily be made available.
The advantages of UHF for direct broadcasting are very great in
terms of satellite construction, compared to lower frequencies.
New receivers would, of course, have to be acquired by listeners,
but these could be quite inexpensive (many low-cost portable
radios already have the capability of tuning the FM-audio
channels of TV stations). A conventional TV antenna positioned
vertically might do, and these could be priced as little as $25.
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From a technical point of view, radio direct satellite
broadcasting appears to be a feasible and very desirable new
medium of international communication, whether at HF or UHF. The
real problems are in the political arena and in marketing, as
described below.
The first requirement is political; the system has to be made
attractive to many nations so that the ITU will allocate the
needed frequencies. If a large number of nations wish to
establish such a system of broadcasting, the pattern at WARCs is
to accommodate them; if just the United States and a handful of
other advanced countries desire it, the chances of getting such
an allocation would be small. It is therefore necessary to
design the system so that it meets the needs and interests of
many countries.
Secondly, the system has to be attractive to millions of
listeners who have to invest in the new equipment, just as they
have now invested in short wave sets. There clearly are hundreds
of millions of persons who find listening to foreign broadcasts
worth an investment of something like $50 to $150 (or more) for
conventional HF receivers. But the number who would make an
investment in new equipment that would permit them to listen to
just one broadcaster, the VOA, is much smaller, even if the
investment were nominal (say $30 to $40). The system being
created has to be one that carries a great variety of
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broadcasting from different countries and of different content.
Listeners want music, education, drama, as well as news. They
like to listen to a variety of exotic far away places. They want
to hear different viewpoints. In short, the successor to the
short wave bands must be as rich and varied in content as short
wave is today, if not more so.
The problem that the United States faces in maintaining an
effective international voice in the satellite era that will
follow the present short wave era is to take the lead in meeting
a widely felt and internationally shared need. In the
contemporary world with large numbers of intensely nationalist
and repressive regimes, that will not be easy. Indeed one can
surmise that if the present system of short wave international
broadcasting, in which so many countries are now engaged, were
not in existence and were presented to an international
conference as a new idea, it might well be rejected. Building
towards the maintenance of such international communications in a
technologically different future will take substantial
imagination.
Specifically, there is the problem that even 50 or 100 radio
channels is not a very large number. Actually this number is
effectively larger than it appears because, with shaped beams,
the same frequencies can be reused in separate locations. Fifty
channels in any one location is a large number. Still, in the
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21st century, one can anticipate that there will be a much larger
number of broadcasters who will want to be heard. Channel
sharing of some kind will certainly be necessary. Perhaps the
optimal scheme is some sort of common carriage that assures every
would-be broadcaster the opportunity to lease time for his
transmissions. This could be done by an international
organization analogous to Intelsat. It could be done by an
international commercial carrier, which we discuss in Section
IV-B-5. It could be done by a U.S.-launched satellite system
that made time available to all comers or by a co-operative
launch. It could be done by an inter-governmental scheme. From
the U.S. point of view the only essential requirement is that we
be able to lease time to broadcast our programs, uncensored and
unregulated. We should be delighted to have the same opportunity
made available to others.
With that kind of system, there is good reason to believe that a
smooth and gradual transition could be made from the present
system of short wave broadcasting to a more advanced, more
widespread, higher quality and less jammable system of satellite
broadcasting, and one which should cost less for broadcasters.
Technically, the space segment could be designed now for service
in a few years, but first the necessary agreements and frequency
assignments have to be negotiated, which could take five to ten
years. Then there will be a transition period as programmers come
on line and receivers get purchased over another five or ten
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years. That may seem too long a period to worry about now.
However, there are some things that must be done now if we are to
avoid finding ourselves cut off from this technological prospect.
Most important is that the government agencies involved in
international communications issues reach a clear understanding
of where we want to go, so that as issues come up about spectrum
allocation, or Intelsat policies or similar matters, we press for
those decisions that keep the options open. At the same time, we
should do what we can to help other countries realize how their
objectives and activities can be served economically and well by
such an international system.
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5. AN INTERNATIONAL COMMON CARRIER.
International broadcasting, as a medium, is more than the sum of
the individual broadcasters. People who would not bother to
listen to VOA alone may become enthusiastic listeners to the
great international debate that takes place on short wave if they
could hear such programs reliably with good quality and at low
cost. They would enjoy hearing all the points of view and enjoy
hearing from different parts of the world, and their enjoyment
and appreciation of VOA would be heightened by comparison,
cross-checking and contrast.
This suggests that as we think about communications services and
systems for the long range future, we not think about VOA in
isolation, but think about what sort of international forum can
be created for the 21st Century that will enable people around
the world to hear the variety of views and interpretations that
will exist. The American view will come out well in such a
forum, as it always has.
We, therefore, strongly suggest that in considering satellite
systems or other advanced communications systems, this country
give substantial attention to the possibility of the development
of international broadcasting common carriers.
MIT Research Program on Communications Policy
VOA - FINAL REPORT 25 April, 1983
IV-B-5. International Common Carrier Page 95
There are many countries that cannot themselves afford a major
effort at international communication. In addition to the 26
countries with superpower transmitters there are another 100
broadcasting countries which do not have them, and many cannot
afford them. A common carrier system that would allow all
countries an opportunity to broadcast some material would have a
wide attractiveness.
Furthermore it could be a private enterprise activity at least in
part. Intelsat, which is in fact operated by the profit-making
Comsat, is one possible model. Or conceivably it could be a set
of competing carriers. It could lease time to private as well as
governmental broadcasters. In any case, the important point for
the United States is that we be able to buy as much broadcasting
time as we wish, and that many other broadcasters also be on the
system, giving it interest, diversity, and credibility.
One can expect that if the United States announced its intent to
prompt the creation of a common carrier satellite broadcasting
system/service that all nations might use, there would be
substantial expression of both welcome and opposition, but
hopefully, the presentation of such an idea would lead to
consideration of how to internationalize the effort to create
such a global instrument of communications.
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V. REACHING THE AUDIENCE
The underlying problem to which this report pertains is how VOA
can reach its potential audiences. There are a number of
barriers that can stand in the way of success. Poor programming
can lose audience interest. Poor transmission can make the
signals inaudible. Use of frequencies for which sets are not
available precludes listening. Expensive receivers cannot be
purchased by many. Deliberate interference can disrupt reception.
Outside of the United States there are over one billion adults in
the world who have access to short wave radio sets. (20) All of
the world's major powers and many of the minor ones are seeking
to reach them. As of April, 22 nations were transmitting with a
total of 93 500-KW transmitters; 31 more such high power
transmitters are under construction, bringing the total to 26
nations using 124 superpower transmitters to get their messages
to the billion listeners.
The United States is not the leader in this competition. The
Soviet Union has 29 500-kW transmitters with eight more under
construction. West Germany has nine such transmitters, France
(20) Gifford D. Malone, Interim Report on Radio Waveband
Coverage, June 7, 1982.
MIT Research Program on Communications Policy
VOA - FINAL REPORT 25 April, 1983
V. VOA's Audience Page 97
has eight with three more under construction, and the UK has two
with six more under construction. The United States has six such
superpower transmitters (or to be precise 12 250-kW transmitters
which can be combined in pairs to achieve the result of six at
500kW). These, however, are at Greenville, North Carolina, much
farther from VOA's overseas audience than the superpower
transmitters of other nations. Countries like Gabon and Libya
have four superpower transmitters each.
In addition to the short wave competition which is becoming more
and more intense, the Voice of America, like other international
broadcasters, tries to reach certain audiences by standard medium
wave (AM) broadcasts where it is possible to site transmitters in
close proximity to them. Here again the United States is at a
disadvantage, but this time not one of our own making. We are
separated from most of the audiences that we wish to reach by
wide oceans. Our only present use of medium wave, for example,
is to broadcast from Florida and Antigua to the Caribbean, from
Greece to the Middle East, from West Germany to some parts of
Eastern Europe, and from Bangkok and Botswana to those local
areas.
The U.S. needs to expand such activities wherever it can. It
cannot, however, hope to rival in volume the AM broadcasts by
other countries to their near neighbors because there are no
available, unused frequency allocations in some of the most
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important areas of the World, particularly in Europe. Given this
constraint and our geography, short wave broadcasting and new
methods of communication such as radio-DSB and wide distribution
of tape cassettes are of primary importance.
Fortunately, the job of bringing to the world's population a
better understanding of our national goals and the realities of
the interplay in world politics, is not that of VOA alone. The
effectiveness of VOA depends not only on its own reliability and
accuracy, but also on being part of a large flow of information
which confirms and makes meaningful what VOA says. The short
wave listening audience hears propaganda claims from the
Communist sources and from their own often unreliable
governments. It turns to VOA, BBC, RFE/RL, and other
broadcasters to clarify what lies behind the unreliable reports
from the distrusted sources. And it turns to other broadcasters
to validate what they hear on VOA. International broadcasting is
thus of a piece; the whole is more than the sum of the parts.
Our allied and other friendly broadcasters are more than just
competitors for the audience. They are part of making a lively,
believable, interesting medium which helps VOA meaningful to its
audience.
The paragraphs following discuss the importance of content,
languages, and receivers as factors in reaching the audience.
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1. CONTENT.
The content of programming is not the subject of this technical
report. Yet it is necessary to note the fact that without
credibility and interesting programming, nothing else will make a
difference since the audience will not be there.
2. LANGUAGES.
Inadequate language coverage limits effectiveness. Unless we
broadcast in languages that the target audience can understand,
nothing else will make a difference. VOA and RFE/RL now
broadcast in a total of 46 languages. The USSR broadcasts in 80.
In the North Africa, Middle East and South Asian region, the
contrast is even more striking: there the USSR broadcasts in 27
languages, while the U.S. is heard through the VOA only in 8
different languages. What is more, most of these broadcasts from
our side are but a few hours a week. There are constraints in
the programming budget and staff, and each additional language
desk costs a substantial amount per year. But the limitations are
also in the transmitters. There are a limited number of
transmitters pointed to any given area of the earth. If a
transmitter is broadcasting in one language it is not available
at the same time to be broadcasting in another.
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It is not within the terms of our study, nor our competence to
suggest priorities in languages for broadcasting, but we do note
that proper transmitter planning requires close attention to
decisions about language priorities. That indeed is the way in
which planning has been done in the past. VOA and NSC staffs
have drafted lists of languages in ranked priority and have thus
derived an estimate of what transmitters would be needed to cover
them at the times required and from the places where relay sites
could be located. This is proper procedure. If we have any
reservations about what has been done, it is that to some degree
the calculations have been done under time pressure in preparing
for budget deadlines. We believe that it would be possible for a
professional staff in the Chief Engineers Office (or a contract
research organization) to develop a computerized planning model
of languages and transmitters that would take account of time
zones, geographical coordinates of transmitter beams and ethnic
populations, and costs for extra language programming. We would
like to see such a computerized planning model in the hands of
VOA. This is one of a number of suggestions we make in section
VI on management tools using computerized modelling to help solve
some of the difficult technical decisions VOA engineering must
make.
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3. RECEIVERS.
If there is to be an audience, broadcasting must be done at
frequencies and with technologies which will deliver the signal
to the intended areas, and for which listeners have receiving
sets. That is one reason why short wave (HF) broadcasting will
remain important for at least the next couple of decades. There
are an estimated 1.3 billion radio receivers in the world. Of the
800 million or so of these that are in countries other than the
U.S., 40-70 percent have some HF bands, depending on the region.
The Soviet bloc has about 160 million radios, with about half the
adults having access to a set which can receive HF.
In contrast to short-wave access, about two-thirds of the adults
in the world have access to a set which receives medium-wave (MF
or, as we term it in North America, AM). It follows that where it
is possible to reach audiences by medium wave it is very
desirable to do so. Medium wave broadcasts, however, do not
carry for very long distances, requiring transmitter siting close
to the intended audience. Also, medium wave radio assignments are
made for national use, and few assigned frequencies remain
unused. Therefore, there may often be no way of broadcasting to
a particular country by medium wave. The USSR has a very great
advantage over the USA in this respect. Since Admiral Mahan's
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day, Russia has been called a "heartland." All along the Soviet
southern and western borders from Vladivostok to the Baltic, a
few hundred miles in, lies a ring of some 25 powerful medium wave
transmitters which reach directly to all of Asia and Europe and
much of Africa. Two-thirds of these are of one-megawatt power,
the remainder are of 500-kW rating. On the other hand, the United
States is on a perimeter, separated from most of its priority
listening areas by wide oceans. Medium wave will not reach from
the Continental U.S., except to audiences close to our southern
border.
Where overseas sites are available, where audiences are in
feasible range, and where frequencies for medium wave
broadcasting exist, it is very important and should be given high
priority. However, short wave (HF) broadcasting, which can go
very long distances by reflection from the ionosphere will remain
the most widely usable instrument for US broadcasting abroad.
Not all HF frequencies are equally receivable by existing sets.
The bulk of short-wave receivers cover only the 6-, 7-, 9-, and
11-MHz bands. A smaller number also receive the 4-, 15-, 17-, and
21-Mhz bands, and an even smaller number cover the 26-MHz band.
Standard sets in the USSR, we have noted, receive only up to
15 MHz. The 26-MHz band suffers from a sort of "chicken or the
egg" situation. Since the 26-MHz band is near the upper limit of
frequencies reflected by the ionosphere, it has much less
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reliable propagation characteristics than the lower bands, and
has not, therefore, been attractive to broadcasters. This in
turn has diminished maker and buyer interest in radio receivers
for 26 MHz. (VOA has estimated that only about 10 percent of
adults worldwide have access to a 26-MHz receiver, and much less
than that in the USSR.) This relatively small receiver
population has served to further reduce broadcaster interest
because even when 26-MHz propagation conditions are right, there
can only be a small audience. The current situation is that less
than one-half percent of all HF broadcasts are made at 26 MHz.
As was discussed in Section IV-B-4, several recent proposals have
suggested the 26-MHz band for radio Direct Satellite Broadcasting
(DSB) use, but recognize that there would only be a small
audience unless a large number of listeners acquire new
receivers, or front-end converters for this band. Should UHF
spectrum be allocated for radio-DSB, as discussed earlier, new
receiving equipment will also be required.
The basic HF effort in the next few years clearly has to be in
the other bands which have plenty of listeners and therefore,
unfortunately, much overcrowding. New modes of broadcasting which
require the listener to invest in new receiving equipment should
not be dismissed for the long run, however. There will be
changes in the world broadcasting system. Satellite
broadcasting, for example, will certainly become a reality in due
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course. However, none of these systems can be a substitute for
ground-based short wave transmitters except in a protracted
process of gradual evolution. We have discussed some of these
issues in greater detail in Sections II-B and IV-B.
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VI. VOA MANAGEMENT ISSUES
A. TECHNICAL LETHARGY -- CAUSE AND EFFECT
It is quite obvious that VOA's internal capability to plan and
execute new facilities probably peaked a number of years ago, as
did its capability to operate its worldwide facilities on the
most efficient basis. This is not to disparage those dedicated
personnel that manage to keep the system going as well as they
do, it is just that a number of factors beyond their control (or
seemingly anyone's control) have combined to make it much more
difficult to maintain the environment which fostered VOA's growth
and operations in its "salad" days. To cite a few of these
factors:
- inflation has affected VOA like almost any other government
agency; wage scales and the costs of materials and services
have risen faster than budgets, forcing cutbacks and
staffing shortages in almost every department, and limiting
capital expenditures for new or better labor-saving
equipment (to some extent this is compounded by the next two
items);
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- VOA shares the staffing problem of most organizations that
started or greatly expanded a generation ago: a large
proportion of original staff members who are now nearing
retirement age, with elevated salary scales compared to
starting level, and not having had the benefit of formal
education in the technology advances of the last 10-15 years
in such important fields as computers, electronics,
communications theory and practice, etc.;
- HF broadcasting technology is almost an anachronism to young
U.S. engineers, with little glamor, few job opportunities
outside the government, and little opportunity to become
proficient in it even if they wanted to (radio engineering,
once a forefront topic, has almost disappeared from college
curricula), and the result is that it is very difficult for
VOA to even find capable young engineers, much less interest
them in hiring on at VOA.
- as with many government agencies, major capital acquisitions
are a real trauma, with detailed scrutiny and "engineering"
judgements by numerous watchdog boards and committees of the
Administration and of the Congress, and even that equipment
that is finally approved is expected by the budget makers to
last forever and never need replacement, even if its
effective half-life is only a few years in today's rapid
pace of technological development;
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- circumstances of the crowded office space situation for
government agencies in Washington have maintained an awkward
physical separation between the Office of Engineering and
Technical Operations and the rest of the agency that tends
to inhibit the close working relationship that is necessary
between engineering and operations on the one hand, and
policy and programming on the other;
- although VOA's mandate from the Congress specifies an
objective and unbiased approach to programming, and this has
been fairly well maintained over the years, the major and
well-publicized turn-overs in top-level personnel in the
last few years have fostered an impression of instability
and political influence that has its effects internally, and
is also sensed by the worldwide audience;
- the inertia of government decision making and inter-agency
relationships at all levels, be it for a simple matter such
as salary scales or for a major initiative such as
negotiation and equipage of a new site, makes progress seem
painfully slow, and things that ought to be settled within a
few weeks or months can often drag on for a year or more.
Given all of the above, it has become difficult for the VOA not
to become totally occupied with the day-to-day problems of
operating an aging plant, with little freedom or resources for
planning for the future in a broadcasting environment that is
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changing rapidly, and that now needs new technological approaches
to properly present the VOA message to its World audience. A few
of our specific observations follow.
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B. PARTICULAR PROBLEM SITUATIONS NOTED
In our visits to VOA facilities, we were struck by the large
amount of manual endeavor and complete lack of automation aids in
such operations as: the handling, editing, and distribution of
news and commentary material; for the very complex process of
scheduling program frequencies and transmitters for the four
broadcast periods of each year; and in the transmitter/receiver
site operations (at least at the Greenville, North Carolina
installation). It is apparent that many have tried over the
years to bring automation aids to these operations, but with
little or no success. In our interviews, we have spoken with
former VOA staffers who said that they had left because they had
become frustrated by the slow pace of events and the consistent
turndown of their requests and plans for equipment to improve the
efficiency of operations such as those mentioned above.
1. COPY PREPARATION AND DISTRIBUTION
Newsroom operations look like a newspaper office of 40 years ago,
with only paper copy for proofing and editing. Once copy is
ready, it is transmitted by teletype, even though the destination
programming or translation office is in the same building. VOA
must have one of the larger collections extant of slow,
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1930's-vintage teletype equipment (Model 28's), with which it
handles an enormous daily message load (as much as 380,000
characters per day) just within the "C" Street building. All
transmission is by manual keying, and most copy gets re-keyed
several times -- before and after editing, after translation,
etc. Delays in message delivery are up to several hours, and the
problems of keying errors are ever present. If ever there was a
situation that was ripe for computer automation, this is it.
Computer data-base systems, with on-line entry and copy editing
via CRT terminals and instantaneous copy delivery anywhere
needed, are now de rigueur in the newspaper business, even for
small-town newspapers. The VOA should quickly follow suit and
eliminate the present clumsy, slow, and labor-intensive method of
passing material from office to office.
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2. FREQUENCY SCHEDULING
We have spent a good deal of time trying to understand the
frequency scheduling process, which is a most important aspect of
VOA operations. The process starts with program sheets developed
by the Office of Programs that list the times of day and
destinations for all the intended programming for a future
broadcast period eight or more months off. The Frequency
Division then works up site, transmitter, antenna, and frequency
schedules, using the NTIA/ITS HFMUFES propagation predictions
(also for eight or more months ahead), monitor reports on past
broadcasts, and any available information on schedules,
transmitter assignments, and frequencies that other broadcasters
intend to use for the same broadcast period, particularly the BBC
and the Deutsche Welle. If the resulting facilities schedule is
not possible, given the VOA's signal strength and
multi-transmitters per time zone guidelines, program schedule
changes may have to be worked out with the Office of Programs.
This is followed by coordination with the BBC and the DW (with
possible modifications), ITU submission (six months ahead), and a
series of working ITU meetings to resolve difficulties that
appear when the proposed schedules of all the World's
broadcasters are merged, again resulting in possible changes.
Thus, the Frequency Division is constantly concerned with three
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or more future schedules at any one time. It divides the World
into four regions that are relatively independent from the point
of view of frequency usage because of their physical separation
and/or beam directions. We understand that although scheduling
each region is properly a full-time job for two people, and that
this was the number (8 total) that was used a few years ago, only
two people are presently available for all four regions. The
current scheduling process may therefore be hurting.
The process as presently practiced is intensely manual, using the
proposed program schedule in combination with a number of
voluminous documents (HFMUFES printouts, VOA facilities
handbooks, competing schedules (BBC, DW, etc.), monitor reports,
operations guidelines on facility retuning times, and so forth.
Because all the various factors are so interlocked, and the
problem is so multidimensional, seemingly simple changes in a
region may be almost as difficult as the original schedule for
that region. We gather from some of our discussions with VOA
personnel that the difficulties of scheduling are not always
appreciated in Programming, especially by new personnel just on
board. Some were particularly critical of Engineering in regard
to the Polish situation in early 1981, when major programming
shifts were needed on a short time scale to meet Administration
desires.
We believe that the VOA should make the development of a
computer-based scheduling process one of its highest priorities.
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By this we do not mean fully automatic scheduling. The problem
is so multi-dimensional that probably no one could devise the
proper optimization criteria for automatic operation. * What
seems practical is a computer-aided data-base system that can
automate all the tedious back and forth, combinatorial lookups
associated with any particular proposed transmission.
Such a program could, for example, quickly present all the
possible site, frequency, transmitter, and antenna combinations
for a proposed program, taking into account a set of criteria,
the predicted propagation conditions, and all other available
information on frequency usage by others at the proposed time.
Those selected by the operator would then be automatically added
to the facilities-usage data base, and taken into account in
presenting possible choices for the next program, etc. If
conflicts develop as the schedule nears completion, requiring
changes in earlier decisions, the program could check all
ramifications of any proposed change and list any problems
encountered.
This sort of program, called "computer-aided" as opposed to
"automatic", has been highly successful in such applications as
air defense (SAGE) and the growing number of design programs for
VLSI circuits and mechanical parts and systems, all applications
* Past attempts to devise automatic redistricting programs for
political districts have all failed for this reason.
Computer-aided programs, however, do work, where humans make
decisions interactively with the help of a computer.
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in which optimization criteria are almost impossible to quantify
and human judgement must be involved.
The ITU has, of course, programs for testing incompatibilities in
its composite world schedules. (22) Such a capability would have
to be a part of a scheduling program. We have learned that there-
is work going on in England on computer-based scheduling. We
have not heard any details of this work, but it should certainly
be looked into as the basis for any VOA development. We might
also note that the propagation data base is already available at
NTIA/ITS, and could be made available by data link or tape.
Again, we stress the importance of bringing modern technology to
the frequency scheduling process. Not only would this improve
productivity, it could possibly result in better schedules. It
would also expedite the process of schedule adjustments and be
invaluable in crisis situations when substantial programming
changes are required on short notice.
(22)
"Computer programmes for determination of incompatibilities in
the Tentative High Frequency Broadcasting Schedules (RR Article
N15/10)," IFRB Circular-letter No. 461, 25 July 1980.
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3. STATION AUTOMATION
We have no specific recommendations concerning particular
automation equipment or the degree of automation VOA should
strive for. It is stating the obvious, however, to note that VOA
could save substantially in operating expenses if fewer people
were required to operate the equipment for a given level of
programming service; also that the use of more modern equipment
than VOA has in the bulk of its plant could greatly reduce the
time required for changing transmitter frequencies and improve
the ability to obtain maximum transmitter utilization in the
morning and evening prime time periods. In older, manually
operated installations, such as Greenville, North Carolina,
transmitter frequency changes within the same band take only
10-20 seconds, but band changes take 15 minutes for 250-kW
transmitters, and 30 minutes for the 500-kW units. One or more
people are needed during a band change. More modern
transmitters, of which VOA has examples at Tinang in the
Philippines, can be switched to any of 100 pre-set frequencies
within 30 seconds, regardless of band.
Completely automated, unattended HF broadcasting sites are also
quite feasible, as illustrated by the Swiss six-transmitter
station at Schwartzenburg, controlled remotely from Zurich. We
understand that the BBC also has one or more remote, unattended
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sites in the British Isles. In both of these situations, the
sites are not too far away from the home base, and can be reached
without undue delay in case of trouble.
A valid concern of VOA Engineering about completely automated
sites is the great geographic separation of its sites and the
poor accessibility of some by commercial transport, both factors
which lead to long travel times. This argument has been raised
in connection with proposals that the planned new MF
installations in the Caribbean be unmanned. A counter argument
that we have heard voiced is that in this particular case, any of
the sites could always be reached within a few hours from
Washington if VOA were to maintain small jet aircraft for this
purpose (or make arrangements for priority, on-call use of other
government or private air service aircraft), and that this would
be less costly than manning the stations with people competent to
fix any and all troubles. (Note that since these are single
transmitters operating on single, fixed frequencies, no
operator-type personnel are required on-site. Also that a
substantial number of AM and FM commercial stations in the
U.S. already operate unmanned transmitters, apparently without
difficulty.)
The situation in many of VOA's overseas sites, present or
potential, are quite different in regard to unmanned operation.
Those without access to commercial power must have people to
handle fuel for their generators, and the generators are probably
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not amenable to unattended operation in any case, certainly not
for lengthy periods of time. We have also heard concerns about
the security of unattended sites, particularly in countries
having a lack of political stability. Finally, there are the
problems of obtaining and maintaining reliable data links for
control purposes. A satellite circuit outage in VOA's present
program feeds affects only the ability to broadcast that program,
but a similar outage in a remote control circuit could be
disastrous. The time-to-reach argument is also valid.
It can be concluded that VOA should push forward into automation
of station equipment, both for operational savings, and for
faster response times in the constant reconfigurations that take
place during any operating day. The degree of automation,
however, should depend on careful cost-benefit analyses, and
considerations such as those that have been mentioned.
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APPENDIX
Documents that were provided to non-VOA contacts prior
to interviews as a basis for discussions.
Background Information on the Voice of America - 6/3/1982
VOA Questions (prepared by M.I.T.) - July 1982
MIT Research Program on Communications Policy
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON
THE VOICE OF AMERICA
Prepared for the MIT Research Program on Communications Policy
by John E. Ward, MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
(Telephone 617 253 3891, Bldg 35-402)
Present Operations
The voice of America operates with the following charter
established by the Congress:
The long-range interests of the United States are
served by communicating directly with the peoples of
the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of
America (the Broadcasting Service of the United
States Information Agency) must win the attention
and respect of listeners. These principles will
govern Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts:
(1) VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and
authoritative source of news. VOA news will be
accurate, objective, and comprehensive.
(2) VOA will represent America, not any single
segment of American society, and will therefore
present a balanced and comprehensive projection of
significant American thought and institutions.
(3) VOA will present the policies of the United
States clearly and effectively, and will also
present responsible discussion and opinion on these
policies.
VOA currently broadcasts in 39 languages with a total program
output of 138 hours per day. It uses 97 HF (shortwave)
transmitters, 67 of which are in overseas sites, and 8 MF (medium
frequency, AM broadcast), seven of which are overseas.
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The 74 overseas transmitters are grouped in 12 relay sites
located as follows:
Poro, Philippines Tangier, Morocco
Tinang, Philippines Columbo, Sri Lanka
Kavala, Greece Bankok, Thailand
Rhodes, Greece Tangier, Morocco
Munich, Germany Botswana
Monrovia, Liberia Wooferton, U.K.
Antigua (Brit. West Indies)
The five largest of these (Kavala, Tinang, Monrovia, Tangier, and
Wooferton) can broadcast on as many as 10 different short- wave
frequencies simultaneously, using directional antennas to aim at
specific audiences as much as 6000 miles away. The MF
transmitters provide more local coverage, but can be directed to
specific quadrants.
Delivering Programs to Listeners
Because of the vagaries of HF ionospheric propogation, the
VOA simulcasts on three different shortwave bands to make sure of
reaching an audience in a given time zone, plus two additional
frequencies for each additional time zone to receive the same
program. Thus to cover three time zones in the USSR with the
same program at the same time, seven transmitters are required,
usually spread over several relay stations. These are the rules
for an unjammed environment. In the presence of jamming, one or
more additional transmitters are scheduled per time zone. (Other
aspects of jamming are discussed later.)
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The VOA also concentrates most of its programming in the
5:30-8:30 am and 6:00 pm-midnight time blocks (local time) when
the intended audience is must likely to be listening. This means
that a number of different language programs must be directed to
a given time zone simultaneously, each requiring three or more
transmitters (as above). These two factors dictate the large
number of transmitters required in VOA's worldwide network, and
an approximate 1300 transmitter hours per day for 138 hours of
programming (assuming that average transmitter utilization is 12
hours per day).
As an indication of the strong coupling between program
hours and the number of transmitters, a current VOA estimate is
that 31 additional HF transmitters will be needed overseas to
increase daily programming by 18 hours (to 156 hours). This is a
42 percent increase in transmitters for a 13 percent increase in
programming.
In addition to the above issues, VOA does not at present
have complete coverage of all those areas of the world that it
would like to reach with a signal of sufficient strength for easy
listening. For a number of years, the VOA coverage diagrams have
been based on a minimum delivered signal strength of 1 millivolt
per meter for unjammed channels, and 2.5 mv/meter (to the extent
possible) for jammed channels. While there is a question of
whether these are the correct signal levels, however new sites
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and/or transmitters are clearly needed to cover the following





North Africa (Mediterranean Coast)
Southeast Africa
South-Central Asia (a radius of 1000 miles around Kashmir)
VOA's current projects, for which funds have been requested
but not yet approved, include:
Sri Lanka - Present facilities are three 35-kW transmitters.
Plan to install two 250-kW and four 500-kW.
Botswana - Present facilities are one 50-kW MF and one 3-kW
HF transmitters. Funds requested to install
four 250-kW HF transmitters (already owned,
reprogrammed from 1977 Liberia authorization).
Is Present Transmitter Power Sufficient?
A further coverage problem is that VOA has not remained
competitive with other nations in HF transmitter power. Half ''of
VOA's overseas HF transmitters are 250 kW; the rest 35-100 kW.
Its only 500-kW units (six) are at Greenville, N.C. Other
nations currently operate 87 HF transmitters of 500-kW rating,
with another 31 under construction. There is a question whether
VOA should go to 500 kW on all new transmitters (and gradually
upgrade older ones) to maintain competitive signals.
Obtaininq and Maintaining Site Agreements
Another interrelated problem is the political one. All
present overseas sites are maintained only with the forbearance
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of the host countries, and some are considered vulnerable at the
present time. The Greek government, for example, has not signed
the new 15-year agreement for the Kavala and Rhodes sites, worked
out with the previous government. The VOA has lost sites in the
past. A former site in Okinawa was closed down 10 years ago
when the Japanese Government did not renew the agreement, leaving
only the Philippine sites to cover the whole of the Asian
continent. An anticipated future loss is that the BBC, which
operates 10 transmitters at Wooferton for VOA, apparently will
exercise "prime use" right on six of these transmitters in 1992,
thereby causing VOA to look for other sites in this region within
the decade. Negotiations for new sites can be quite difficult
and drawn out, and must include considerations of the host
country's relations with the target countries. For example,
Israel might well agree to a VOA facility for USSR-language
broadcasts. For diplomatic reasons, however, the VOA would not
wish to use a relay site on Israeli territory for Arabic-language
broadcasts to Israel's neighbor countries.
Jamming
After a hiatus of seven years, the USSR resumed jamming of
VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union on August 20, 1980. Current
jamming of VOA, RFE/RL, BBC, Deutsche Welle (DW), Kol Israel, and
Radio Peking transmissions to Soviet-bloc countries is extensive,
using both sky-wave jamming for distant areas and ground-wave
jammers for local, metropolitan areas. The effectiveness of
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ground-wave jamming within the USSR can only be surmised.
Sky-wave jamming, however, also affects areas far from the USSR.
A March, 1982 survey indicates that roughly the following
percentages of all channels in the 7-, 9-, 11-, 15-, and 17-MHz
bands are essentially useless in the evening hours 1700-2300
local time in the indicated locations (Ref. 2):








(These percentages are averaged from hour-by-hour percentages for
each band: excluding Washington, the raw data spread is from 26
to 86 percent useless channels for particular band-hour-site
combinations.)
The only real solution to jamming must apparently be a
political one, since no feasible technical solutions have emerged
(except to go to higher signal strength levels and more
simultaneous transmission frequencies in an attempt to break
through). Until jamming can be stopped, or some means of
combating it devised, the VOA must be content with greatly
reduced effectiveness in reaching many of its targets. At the
same time, the present deliberate negation of half of the most
useful short-wave channels represents a world-wide problem that
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will no doubt be a major issue at the upcoming International
Telecommunications Union short-wave conferences in 1984 and 1986.
Program Feeds from the US
VOA maintains a complete world-wide HF-relay method of
distributing its programming, all of which originates in the
Washington studios. This includes three U.S. sites with 24
transmitters; the North Carolina site also directly serves South
American listeners. Each of the 15 VOA transmitter sites has a
separate receiving station located 20-30 miles away, some of
these having as many as 20 large rhombic antennas aimed at other
sites to receive programming from them. Program quality
deteriorates the more relays (receptions and retransmissions) are
needed to reach a given transmitter site. Starting in 1978, the
VOA began using commercial satellite circuits to some sites,
leasing local telephone authority (PTT) landlines to get from the
host-country PTT downlink to the VOA transmitter site.
Reliability has been a problem, particularly with the leased land
lines. VOA would like to install its own receive dishes on-site,
but political problems prevent this at present. VOA therefore
feels that it must maintain and man its HF relay system as backup
for the foreseeable future. Also, some sites are not currently
reachable by satellite-PTT links.
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Access to the Shortwave Spectrum




75 3.9 - 4.0
49 5.95 - 6.2
41 7.1 - 7.3
31 9.5 - 9.775
25 11.7 - 11.975
19 15.1 - 15.450
16 17.7 - 17.9
13 21.0 - 21.75
11 25.6 - 26.1
The actual frequencies used within these bands are coordinated on
a quarterly basis with other non-Soviet-bloc countries through
the ITU (the best frequencies for particular paths change with
the season of the year and with the sun spot cycle). The 26-MHz
band is the least used by VOA (and other world broadcasters)
because it is seldom in the range of useful ionospheric
propagation frequencies; also only a small fraction of the
world's shortwave receivers will tune to this band.
The best bands for particular paths also change by the hour
on a daily basis, as illustrated by the attached plot (Ref. 1).
The VOA therefore predicts the average hourly propogation
conditions for each month of the year along some 200 paths
between sites (for program feed) and between sites and listener
areas. These predictions are used to schedule which
transmissions should use which frequencies at which times. The
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prediction is by computer program (some 620 pages of printout),
but the scheduling is largely manual. In order to accomplish the
necessary ITU coordination, the predictions must be made seven
months ahead, preliminary coordination is started six months
ahead, and monthly coordination update continues until the
schedule goes into effect.
As more and more of the world's 130 countries enter the HF
broadcast arena and/or broadcast in more languages and to new
areas, the bands are becoming very crowded. VOA is concerned
about future access to the spectrum, particularly if the present
rules for frequency coordination (adopted in 1948) are changed at
the international shortwave meetings upcoming in 1984 and 1986.
Potential New Technologies
During the past few years, there have been several proposals
for use of direct-broadcast satellites (DBS) to augment or
supplant present HF ionospheric voice-radio transmissions. The
26-MHz band has been considered in several of these because it is
already assigned for international broadcasting, is little used,
and appears to be reliable in ionospheric penetration, whereas it
is not in surface-to-surface propogation via ionospheric
reflection. (VOA is also interested in examining the feasibility
of DBS on lower HF bands -- e.g., 21 and 17 MHz -- because of the
much greater number of in-place receivers world-wide.) Very
large space antennas and high transmitter power are, however,
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required for HF DBS operation if the goal is to deliver signal
levels of one millivolt per meter (or more) for "radio"
listening. Much more economical spacecraft could be built if a
much higher frequency could be used, but then there would be the
problems of finding spectrum space, and getting proper receiving
equipment into the hands of world-wide listeners. The latter
would also be a problem for 26-MHz DBS, as has been discussed,
but UHF or SHF reception would probably also require high-gain
antennas, which could create difficulties for would- be
listeners, particularly in Soviet-bloc countries.
The question of DBS has arisen in all recent discussions of
VOA planning as a potential solution to many of the issues that
have been discussed herein -- coverage, overseas sites, power,
jamming, spectrum access, and cost per channel hour. However,
there are very large technical, cost and political issues to
solve before general use can be made of DBS (not to mention the
problems of distributing new 26 MHz or higher-frequency receivers
to a worldwide audience).
Another technique that might substantially improve delivered
signal strengths for the present ground-based VOA network is to
use back-scatter measurements to dynamically optimize the
elevation launch angles of transmitter antennas, a technique
possibly now being used by Radio Moscow (Ref. 3). Tests
performed for VOA by Stanford Electronics Laboratories in 1967 on
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a one-hop path of 1300 km indicated that backscatter echos could
be used to pick the better of two launch angles (10 and 20
degrees) with a reliability of about 80%, and with delivered
signal strength improvements as high as 12 dB at some times of
day (Ref. 4). Implementation of this technique would require
modification of present antennas for elevation slewing (or
multiple antennas with different fixed elevation angles for each
transmission azimuth). It also appears that to obtain the
greatest benefit, a method of obtaining frequent data on actual
ionospheric layer heights along all paths of interest would be
needed. This is because the layer heights affect the round-trip
delay time to any particular point on the earth's surface.
Unless the layer heights are known fairly accurately, one doesn't
know from what ground range the strongest echo is being returned.
Top-side ionospheric sounding from satellites is one possibility.
VOA Statistics
VOA employs some 2000 people, about half overseas, with 700
of the latter being foreign nationals. In addition to budgetary
restrictions and Administration edicts against filling vacancies
on a one-for-one basis, qualified HF personnel are becoming
harder and harder to find, both in the U.S. and abroad. The
result is that some headquarters staff, including branch chiefs,
have had to be transferred overseas to keep sites running, and
their posts remain vacant.
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The estimated replacement cost of the present VOA network
facilities is $1B. The total transmitter output power (as of
1981) is 20.6 megawatts. The annual operating costs of typical
overseas sites are:
Munich $2.7M (small station)
Philippines $4.1M (medium-size station)
These include salaries and related expenses for foreign national
employees, but not VOA U.S. personnel on-site. The cost of power
to operate sites is of increasing concern. For example, the
budgeted power cost for the Philippines relay station in FY'82 is
$2,280,000, 55.5% of the operating budget.
The current annual operating budget of the VOA as a whole is
$108M (FY 1982). The fiscal 1983 budget request is $117M. In
addition, VOA has requested $118M in FY'83 for the new
transmitter construction in Sri Lanka and Botswana.
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CONTEXTUAL QUESTIONS
In your answers to questions about transmission facilities and
capabilities, what are you assuming to be VOA's priorities of purpose?
In ways that affect transmission, what should be VOA's relationship to
other HF broadcasters? Are there potential economies of scale in joint
facilities?
In your comments about transmission, what are your assumptions about
VOA's balance in broadcasting to allies, friends, and foes?
To what extent is relay station planning (upgrades, new sites)
affected by uncertainties in future language priorities?
To what extent should VOA conduct regular planning exercises to
develop means for quick response to crisis situations, such as
the Administration directive in late-1980 to greatly increase
daily programming to Poland?
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TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING.
What is the future of international broadcasting in general? What
is the future of high-frequency (shortwave) transmission versus
other methods?
Is HF on the increase, decrease, or constant in its importance?
In what regions are these trends to be found?
How will the use of HF be affected by levels of RF interference?
How will it be affected by levels of competition for HF spectrum?
Will shifts in audience interest affect HF importance?
What is the payback for U.S. investment in HF broadcasting?
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INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
How will the terms of spectrum access needed for international
broadcasting change in the future? Will access be different for
VOA than for others; or different for some nations or regions
than others?
In 1984 and 1986 there will be ITU broadcast conferences. What
are the problems likely to be brought up? What will the U.S. have
to face? What should the U.S. position be and how will this af-
fect VOA's future plans? What should be the U.S. fallback
positions and plans for HF broadcasting?
How does the quarterly frequency bargaining with our friends work
out in practice?
Do you anticipate changes in the bargaining process as a result of
the upcoming HF conferences?
Can data processing and communications innovations improve the
bargaining process?
Do you foresee and changes or improvements in the present system
by which host countries obtain operating frequencies for VOA?
Are any improvements needed?
How do you feel about the use of MF (AM) or even FM (VHF)
frequencies for international broadcasting?
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ALTERNATIVES TO HF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING?
Direct broadcast satellites (DBS): are they feasible technically?
politically? Would they be cost-effective? In your view, what
frequencies and technologies should be considered?
Would it be reasonable to lease time on other HF transmitters?
What arrangements would make this secure and dependable?
Could the common-carrier concept be applied to international
broadcasting whereby equal access would be available on neutral
transmitters for all nations? Who would enforce this or regulate
charges? Could this concept be applied to a subset of nations
willing to cooperate in international broadcasting? (Questions
pertain to both ground and DBS transmitters.)
Should the VOA investigate leasing audio channels on CATV systems
overseas? Is it likely that such systems would have a significant
penetration in developed regions within the decade?
Are there any other techniques for delivering VOA's message that
may be effectuated in the next decade or two?
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SITES AND EQUIPMENT.
What is the feasibility of high-frequency or medium-wave
transmitters at sea?
Are there remote islands and/or desert regions that should be
considered as transmitter sites?
What are the economics of many small transmitter sites versus
fewer, but larger stations?
What is the feasibility of replacing some or all overseas sites
by stateside transmissions, making use of higher power, higher
antenna gains, and possibly sophisticated techniques such as
backscatter sounding?
Are there any new high-frequency transmission techniques?
What are the possibilities for achieving greater flexibility in
the use of transmitters? How can they be rapidly redirected?
What affect does that have on programming times and patterns?
What are the possibilities for centralized remote control?
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JAMMING.
What are the political possibilities of stopping jamming?
Are there any technical solutions?
What are the trends in jamming?
What is the probability that other than Communist-bloc or
belligerent nations will start jamming?
Is an increase in transmitter power the most cost-effective means
at VOA's command to combat jamming?
Are there advantages of certain transmitter locations over others
in regard to relative immunity to jamming within Soviet-bloc areas?
Are there incentives of a economic or technical nature that could
lead the Soviets to reduce or eliminate jamming?
MIT Research Program on Communications Policy
VOA questions July 1982
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980'S
Signal delivery standards:
Number of frequencies per time zone when there is no jamming?
When there is jamming?
The present VOA goals for minimum delivered signal strengths are
1 millivolt per meter with no jamming and 2.5 mv/m when there is
jamming. Are these correct standards? Too large-? Too small?
Transmitter power:
Is the present VOA standard of 250 kw sufficient? If not, what
power level should be used (500kw; more)?
Present transmitters have efficiencies of about 50 percent. Are
more efficient designs possible?
Antenna technology
Should more directive antennas be used to increase effective
radiated power (ERP) to counter jamming or other interference in
critical, small listener locations?
Does the use of backscatter sounding to dynamically optimize
antenna elevation angle as the ionosphere changes represent a
feasible and cost-effective way of improving delivered signal
strengths?
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TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980'S
Most VOA antennas have a single, fixed elevation angle at any
given frequency; a few curtains at Kavala have two angles
selectable by switching. What elevation slewing capability is
needed for optimization of delivered signals by backscatter
sounding? How difficult is this to implement? What are the cost
tradeoffs versus higher transmitter power?
Backscatter techniques may require frequent, fairly precise data
on ionospheric layer heights along the transmission path in order
to know at what ground range the signal is being optimized. How
can such data be obtained? Top-side sounding from satellites?
Program feeds to relay stations:
Commercial satellite circuits are now providing improved signal
quality feeds to some overseas relay stations via PTT local lines.
Can on-station receive-only dishes be negotiated to avoid
reliance on local PTT circuits connecting PTT downlink facilities
with VOA relay stations?
System engineering:
In the total VOA communications system, what interactions are there
between incoming and outgoing communications? Between information
processing and communications?
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TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980'S
What improvements are possible in signal prediction? To what
extent does monitoring data help? Should the present level of
monitoring activity be increased? Are automatic, unmanned
monitoring devices feasible?
Is the present ITU method of calculating interferences between
world broadcasters adequate? What improvements could be made?
What R&D capabilities does VOA need for the future?
Automation:
To what degree can new transmitter equipment and stations be
automated to reduce operating costs and overseas manpower
requirements?
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